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THIS HAS BEEN A RELATIVELY QUIET YEAR for land use, planning and
zoning issues in the nation's legislatures and courts. The trend has
been towards amplification and consolidation, except for a few
matters with implications for land use: the Administration's rel-
atively new enterprise zone proposals,' the Community Com-
munications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder2 case, United States
Corps of Engineers-Section 404 (Clean Water Act)3 permitting
authority in coastal areas, and the state court fall-out from the
United States Supreme Court's San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.
City of San Diego4 nondecision (taking and compensation issue).
The balance of this article deals with relatively recent develop-
ments (through early 1982) in the courts and legislatures in plans as
laws, growth management, development rights, zoning and mora-
toria, housing and open space, section 1983 actions with land use
implications, and transportation-related land use issues. A catch-
all section deals with random cases and statutes which do not easily
fit into the above categories.' Finally, a "pertinent foreign de-
*Special thanks to research assistants Marjorie Au and Gail Tamashiro,
second-year editors of the Law Review of the University of Hawaii School of
Law.
1. 128 CONG. REC. S2945-56 (1982); President's Message to Congress on the
Enterprise Zone Tax Act of 1982; Soloman & Soloman, Enterprise Zones, Tax
Incentives and the Revitalization of Inner Cities, 1981 DET. C.L. REV. 797 (1981).
2. __ U.S.. , 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
3. Clean Water Act of 1977, § 404, 33 U.S.C. 1251 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4. 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Callies, Land Use Controls: An Eclectic Summary for
1980-1981, 13 URB. LAW. 723 (1981).
5. This brief report obviously does not summarize all the matters that have
recently occurred at the legislative and judicial levels which would be of interest to
practitioners in the land use field. For more regular "early warnings" of such
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velopment in land use section" is added, thanks to substantive
contributions from judges and lawyers from several jurisdictions
(England, Canada, Australia) and the random wanderings of the
author (People's Republic of China). As many of our national
legislative models (i.e., the ALI's Model Land Development
Code)6 and bills, as well as an increasing number of state bills, take
some of their concepts if not their language from such "foreign"
jurisdiction (especially the common law ones) such a review often
provides a glimpse of things to come.
I. The Urban Enterprise Zone:
Requiem for Local Zoning?
Virtually the sole significant urban policy generated by the current
Administration in Washington is the recently introduced Enter-
prise Zone Tax Act of 1982.1 Modeled roughly on England's enter-
trends and events, I have for years found the American Planning Association's
monthly LAND USE PLANNING AND ZONING DIGEST to be immensely valuable and
conveniently indexed. More current, but random, in coverage is the weekly
newsletter LAND USE PLANNING REPORTS and APA Planning and Law Division's
newsletter. Both carry state and regional developments and a running list of land
use conferences as regular features. Finally, the following recent A.L.R. annota-
tions may prove helpful to practitioners currently faced with particularly narrow
issues requiring immediate solution based upon current case law: Annot., Statutes
of Limitation: Actions by Purchasers or Contractees Against Vendors or Contrac-
tors Involving Defects in Houses or Other Building Caused by Soil Instability, 12
A.L.R. 4th 866 (1982); Annot., Validity of Ordinance Restricting Number of
Unrelated Persons Who Can Live Together in Residential Zone, 12 A. L.R. 4th 238
(1982); Annot., What Constitutes Accessory or Incidental Use of Religious or
Educational Property Within Zoning Ordinance, 11 A.L.R. 4th 1084 (1982);
Annot., Construction of New Building or Structure on Premises Devoted to
Nonconforming Use As Violation of Zoning Ordinance, 10 A.L.R. 4th 1122
(1981); Annot., Standing of Civic or Property Owners' Association to Challenge
Zoning Board Decision, 8 A.L.R. 4th 1087 (1981); Annot., Funeral Home As
Private Nuisance, 8 A.L.R. 4th 324 (1981); Annot., Zoning: Validity and Con-
struction of Provisions of Zoning Statute or Ordinance Regarding Protest by
Neighboring Property Owners, 7 A.L.R. 4th 732 (1981); Annot., Enforcement of
Zoning Regulation as Affected by Other Violations, 4 A.L.R. 4th 462 (1981);
Annot., Validity of "War Zone" Ordinances Restricting Location of Sex-Oriented
Businesses, 1 A.L.R. 4th 1297 (1980); Annot., Zoning Regulations Prohibiting or
Limiting Fences, Hedges, or Walls, 1 A.L.R. 4th 373 (1980); Annot., Zoning or
Licensing Regulation Prohibiting or Restricting Location of Billiard Rooms and
Bowling Alleys, 100 A.L.R. 3d 252 (1980); Annot., Halfway Houses: Housing
Facilities for Former Patients of Mental Hospital as Violating Zoning Restrictions,
100 A.L.R. 3d 876 (1980).
6. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (1975).
7. S. 2298, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2946-53 (1982).
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prise zone legislation,8 the Administration's bill closely parallels
the Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act of 1981, first introduced
by Representative Jack Kemp (Republican/New York) and
Robert Garcia (Democrat/New York) in 1980. The bills are analy-
zed in detail in another part of this issue.9 Basically, both provide
for a series of percentage breaks for businesses and their em-
ployees who locate or relocate in certain economically and physi-
cally deteriorated areas."° These areas, called enterprise zones,
would be designated by the Secretary of the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development upon application of a local govern-
ment, either in concert with the Administration's bill or with the
tacit approval of the Kemp-Garcia bill the responsible state
government." Both bills apparently contemplate a "competition"
among local government applicants for a limited number of avail-
able designations: twenty-five per year for three years. 2 Such
designations would be based on criteria contained in the respective
bills and to be formulated in regulations. Essentially, potential
enterprise zones must meet eligibility requirements for receiving
Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG)I3 as well as the
following:114
1. Unemployment at 1.5 times the national average.
2. Twenty percent of the potential residential population "in
poverty."
3. Seventy percent of the potential residents with incomes be-
8. Contained mainly in Schedule 32 of the Local Government, Planning and
Land Act, 1980, discussed in more detail in the foreign land use experience
portion of this report, taken from a paper prepared by English solicitor, P. J.
Purton (chairman of the Law Society's Local Government Committee) and Clive
Douglas.
9. See Callies & Tamashiro, Enterprise Zones (forthcoming article in 15 URB.
LAW.); S. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES (1981);
Lloyd, Enterprise Zones: The American Experience, 1982 EST. GAZETTE 745;
Myers, Urban Enterprise Zones: UDAG Revisited?, 33 HIST. PRESEVATION 12
(1981); G. STERNLIEB, NEW TOOLS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1981).
10. H.R. 3824, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S5837-41 (1981); S.
2298, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2946-53 (1982).
11. S. 2298, supra note 10, at § 101(a)(3)(A); H.R. 3824, supra note 10, at
§ 101(a)(1)(C).
12. S. 2298, supra note 10, at § 101(e); H.R. 3824, supra note 10, at
§ 101(a)(2)(C).
13. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 119, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5318 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
14. S. 2298, supra note 10, at § 101(c)(3); H.R. 3824, supra note 10, at
§ 101(c)(3).
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low eighty percent of the median income of the area as a
whole.
4. Ten percent population loss.
5. Abandonment and blight.
From the perspective of land use policy, the most critical provi-
sion of the bills is Section 101(d) in the Kemp-Garcia bill, and the
HUD fact sheet (presumably an outline for later regulations)
accompanying the Administration bill, contemplating a local gov-
ernment "contract" to do its share of reducing local government
barriers to business investment. Among other suggested "incen-
tives" (real property tax holiday, foreign trade zones, etc.) is the
suggestion that local governments virtually do away with land use
controls within the zone.1 5 Suggesting that regulatory relief which
"will cost the state and local governments nothing" should (there-
fore) be "a central element of any state and local incentive
package"' 6 the HUD fact sheet heads the list of proposed regulat-
ing relaxation or elimination with zoning:
Zoning Laws
One web of entangling regulations which stifle economic activity stems from
zoning laws. By restricting the uses to which property can be put, these laws
often prevent businesses and other property owners from devoting their prop-
erty to its most productive use. Many potential entrepreneurs may be pre-
vented from going into business altogether because of restrictions on property
they own or on other available property. The result is not only reduced
property values, but inefficiency and misallocation of resources.
Moreover, within an enterprise zone, where substantial new but unknown
economic activity is expected, the area should be opened up to a broad range of
potential activities. Prejudging these activities by restrictive zoning regulations
might forestall the potential boom altogether.
It is recognized, however, that zoning laws often are undertaken to preserve
property values, for example, by prohibiting nuisance activities. Also, zoning
may be the best means for preserving housing areas within enterprise zones.
The relaxation of zoning restrictions, rather than their elimination, may,
therefore, be the preferred course of action by local officials. 7
A few items later come building codes:
Building Codes
Yet another web of local regulations stem from building codes. These regula-
tions, though well-intended, often impose heavy, unnecessary costs on
businesses and developers, thwarting economic activity. The regulations in
many cases are poorly suited to the particular circumstances of businesses or
developers, who could achieve the same result through a cheaper, alternative
method. The codes are also often outdated, requiring the use of outmoded and
15. The Administration's Enterprise Zone Proposal Sheet (March 1982).
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id.
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unnecessarily costly methods. Featherbedding requirements are also often
included in the codes, again unnecessarily increasing costs.
Purging the codes of these drawbacks would be a beneficial contribution to
enterprise zones. Another alternative is to impose liability on builders for
defects in their buildings and require them to have insurance. Since the insur-
ance company would have to pay for any defects, it would not issue insurance
for unsafe buildings. Yet competition would force it to maintain the flexibility
to adapt to the conditions of each builder and avoid the imposition of unneces-
sary costs.18
The fact sheet also suggests a vastly expedited permitting pro-
cess, including a "one-stop shopping office for permits":
Permit Requirements
Entrepreneurs attempting to start new businesses are often faced with a myriad
of permit requirements which must be satisfied before the business can begin.
In addition to the sheer burden of complying with these requirements,
businessmen are often faced with substantial delays because of poor adminis-
tration of permit issuance. In some cases, denial of a permit will unnecessarily
force a business establishment out of existence.
One way of addressing these problems would be to establish a one-stop shop-
ping office for permits for enterprise zone businesses. Another alternative is to
eliminate most or all of these requirements. An entrepreneur in an enterprise
zone should not have to get the government's permission to start a business.19
While zoning and building codes no doubt do contribute to the
delay many developers encounter in undertaking land develop-
ment projects, it is somewhat alarming to have the nation's major
urban policy department characterize them as "entangling regula-
tions" and a "web of regulations" which "stifle economic activity."
Obviously any exercise of the police power results in some restric-
tion of freedom. Yet the tradeoff is supposed to be the protection
of the health, safety and welfare of the people for whom the
government is responsible in passing the regulation. Surely HUD
is aware of the other purposes of zoning-that is, to protect
citizens, implement plans, preserve amenities, protect property
values. Indeed, some commentators have suggested it was busi-
ness which foisted zoning upon us in the first place!2" In any event,
virtually every city, village and county in the United States has
some rudimentary form of zoning, and in most places, it is alive
and well.2'
As for building codes, they go back to our basic health laws.
Contradictory and outdated though some may be, few would
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id.
20. See, J. DE NUEFVILLE, THE LAND USE POLICY DEBATE IN THE U.S. 1-2
(1981).
21. C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING: THE ONCE AND FUTURE FRONTIER
(1979).
consider them simply a necessary evil. As for permitting require-
ments, the call for simplification is not new,22 and if the Adminis-
tration's urban enterprise zone package can accomplish some
streamlining of the process, so much the better.
Once again, it is not so much the need for reform of certain land
use controls that is troublesome about HUD's fact sheet items on
zoning and building codes, but the bald and inaccurate character-
ization of them as basically evil and unnecessary. This is a remark-
able attitude by the nation's guardian of our urban environment,
and somewhat at variance with Administration policy to leave
local matters-like zoning-to local government.
So much for what HUD will require of local government. What
will the federal government provide as incentives? The answer is
not a whole lot, especially as compared with England's enterprise
zone program. Under the Administration's proposal employers
would be allowed tax credits equal to five to fifty percent of wages
paid to eligible zone employees.23 Enterprise zone firms would be
eligible for elimination of capital gains tax, an increase in tax
credits for investments in the zone, and an extended loss carry-
over.2 Zone employees would be eligible for an income tax credit
equal to five percent of their qualified wages.25 Provisions are also
included for regulatory relief and the establishment of foreign
trade zones.
By comparison, the United Kingdom Act provides for 100 per-
cent exemption from their equivalent to capital gains tax on all
land, 100 percent allowance for income tax purposes for all capital
expenditures on industrial and commercial buildings, direct ex-
emption from all real property tax for ten years (repaid to local
governments by the national government) and lifting of most land
use controls (in accordance with a predetermined, simple zone
plan) except building codes and environmental laws.26
Although the tax breaks at the federal level may seem generous,
with the Administration predicting a seventy-five percent tax re-
duction for average zone corporations,27 it may not match the
incentives offered by the British government because no provi-
sions are made at the federal level for the elimination of real
22. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D. FEURER & C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION
(1976).
23. S. 2298, supra note 10, at § 201.
24. Id.
25. S. 2298, supra note 10, at § 202.
26. The Local Gov't, Planning and Land Act of 1980, Schedule 32.
27. 127 CONG. REC. S. 2945 (1981).
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property taxes. Under the United States proposals, a business with
no income tax liabilities may still be burdened with real property
taxes.
This brief summary is not meant to replace the analysis else-
where in this issue. 8 Indeed, several workshops and conferences-
including one sponsored by our Section 29-- were recently devoted
to the subject, at which it appears that many local governments
around the country are preparing to apply for enterprise zone
designation as soon as national legislation is passed.30 Indeed,
some local enterprise zone bills have already become law in some
states.3' However, even here and at this stage, a few questions are
worth raising:32
1. Will they attract new business or merely cause existing busi-
ness to move in-and should it matter?
2. What is the focus besides redevelopment of an "economically
deteriorated" area-to help small or large business-and
should it matter?
3. What protection for land use if planning/zoning controls are
lifted-such as for historic buildings and districts?
4. Will "border" businesses just outside the zones be adversely
affected?
5. Will private landlords raise rents to small businesses thereby
negating the effect of tax breaks?
6. Will the numerous owners of public land transfer it in fee, as
many had hoped', or will they rent only and impose conditions
by means of lease covenents as onerous as the newly lifted
land control?
7. Will skilled workers be "poached" from areas outside the
enterprise zone?
8. What is the long-term effect of local property tax exemption
on the national economy, especially if more zones are desig-
nated?
28. Callies & Tamashiro, supra note 9.
29. Enterprise Zone Workshop (sponsored by the Section on Urban, State and
Local Gov't of the ABA) (May 4, 1982, Washington, D.C.).
30. Accord 47 PLAN. 8 (May 1981). The following states have introduced
enterprise zone enabling legislation: Indiana, New York, California and Illinois.
31. Urban Enterprise Zone Act, VA. CODE §§ 59.1-270-84 (1980 & Supp.
1982).
32. D. Callies, Enterprise Zones: British Experience Applicable to U.S.
Proposals (May 12, 1982) (unpublished paper presented at the National Confer-
ence of the Am. Plan. Ass'n. Dallas, Texas); Honolulu Advertiser, July 26, 1981,
at G-3.
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The answers are not at all clear, but some glimmerings may be
had from recent United Kingdom experience.33 So far fourteen
enterprise zones have been formally designated by the Central
Government" from among many more which made application.
Ranging in size from a few dozen to several hundred acres, few of
the sites are entirely vacant (vacant Ford and Dunlop plants at
Speke, Liverpool; docks and buildings at Isle of Dogs and Salford/
Trafford, for example), but many have large undeveloped acreage
(i.e., Swansea). In some zones (Swansea, Clydebank, Speke,
Wakefield, Corby) the land is principally government owned; in
others (Dudley, Tyneside, Belfast, Hartlepool) it is mostly pri-
vately held.35
By and large, the principal land use restrictions applicable to the
sites are environmental, health and building codes, and restric-
tions on retail use. Each of the local authorities involved have
agreed in advance that commercial and industrial buildings within
certain height limits (and at times excluding particularly noxious
uses) will be permitted without further application for such, as
planning permits. The retail limitations-some quite severe"-
reflect local merchants' concern for survival of existing retail cen-
ters, should discount centers ("hypermarkets") locate in the zones
with all the benefits such locations would confer.
So far the response of potentially new business to the zones has
been fair to good, though it is yet unclear how much represents a
mere "shift over the boundary." Thus, for example, since
designation,37 thirteen "speculative" units of industrial develop-
ment have been completed at Dudley; forty more have been
completed at Salford/Trafford; twenty-four have been completed
at Tyneside, and construction has begun on a 37,000-square foot
new facility for Vickers; sixty-eight new units are complete at
Speke; more than twenty new companies have moved into
Clydebank; and thirty-two new firms have moved into the Swansea
33. Further analysis is contained infra pp. 839-44 from a thorough analysis
made by English solicitors P.J. Purton and Clive Douglas.
34. Belfast, Clydebank, Glasgow, Corby, Dudley, Hartlepool, Isle of Dogs,
Newcastle/Gateshead, Salford, Trafford, Speke (Liverpool), Swansea and
Wakefield. Financial Times Survey, Sept. 8, 1981, at 11-14, and The Times,
Special Report, March 9, 1982.
35. Id.
36. Corby, for example, will still require planning permission for food, drink
and retailing business in excess of 2,475 square feet. Financial Times Survey,
supra note 34.
37. DOE Enterprise Zone Projects Review (Nov. 1981); The Times, Special
Report, March 9, 1982.
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zone, but twenty-five moved from other parts of Swansea, and only
seven are "new" ventures. Some at Salford/Trafford say most
inquiries and move-ins come from within five miles of the zone. Do
the zones then merely "reshuffle" business? Moreover, it is re-
ported that large rent increases have occurred since designation in
Swansea and Tyneside, and land in the Dudley zone is twice as
expensive as that just outside. 8
In several instances, zone boundaries have been modified to
bring in businesses just outside the original zones.39 Also, the
response of major institutional investors has not been terribly
positive, with some expressing concerns normally identified with
the Town and County Planning Association and some amenity
groups: that the relaxation of planning controls will lead to hasty
and unfortunate development decisions with detrimental effect
on nearby properties.' Finally, the Conservative government
announced (in July of this year) its intention to approve ten addi-
tional zones.4' It appears the British, at least, view enterprise zones
as in some measure successful.
II. Boulder, the Demise of Home Rule, and
Land Use Implications
The decision today effectively destroys the "home rule" movement in this
country, through which local governments have obtained, not without present
state opposition, a limited autonomy over matters of local concern. 2
Has the United States Supreme Court destroyed home rule?
Yes, according to its Chief Justice and two Associate Justices. It
has done so by applying the federal antitrust laws to the home rule
city of Boulder, Colorado. If, as the majority of the Court writes,
"[o]urs is a 'dual system of government' which has no place for
sovereign cities,"43 then many cities will find their home rule pow-
ers drastically curtailed. Will that make a difference?
38. Purton & Douglas, Enterprise Zones in the United Kingdom (Paper pre-
pared for the land use, planning and zoning committee, Section on Urban, State
and Local Government, American Bar Ass'n) (March 1981).
39. Swansea is an example.
40. See Remarks of Chief Swansea Planning Officer Maurice Howell, in BDP
Enterprise Zone Workshop Report of Proceedings (November 1981). See also,
Greg Lloyd, Enterprise Zones: Some Economic and Spatial Implementation
(June 1980) (unpublished discussion paper).
41. Interview with John Stambollovian, Senior Planning Officer, Department
of the Environment, London, Sept. 16, 1982.
42. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, -U.S.
__ , 102 S. Ct. 835 845 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. Id., 102 S. Ct. at 840 (maj. op.).
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"Home rule" is a catchy bit of jargon applied to cities and
counties which wrest control of local affairs from the state. Under
our federal §ystem of government, the states are the source of
sovereign governmental power. The federal government has only
such power that the states gave to it in 1789. Therefore, those
powers not specifically granted to the federal government in the
United States Constitution continue to reside in the states. The
only limit on state sovereignty is its own state constitution, setting
out what its citizens have decided their sovereign states may not
do.
It is here-in the state constitution-that many cities and coun-
ties have wrung from the state the authority to manage all or part of
their own affairs. So-called "local government" sections of the
state constitution set out these powers. Without this limit on state
power over cities and counties, such local governments are mere
creatures of the state, to be governed entirely by state legislation-
to be created, changed, even abolished at the discretion of the state
legislature.
Enter Community Communications Company, Inc. v. City of
Boulder." Exercising extremely broad home rule power guaran-
teed by the Colorado Constitution, Boulder passed an "emer-
gency" ordinance prohibiting a cable TV firm from expanding its
business for three months while Boulder drafted a model cable
television ordinance. Community Communications claimed the
emergency ordinance restrained its business contrary to the fed-
eral antitrust laws. Indeed, just four short years ago the Supreme
Court did hold that non-home rule cities were subject to such laws.
But Boulder claimed that home rule cities and counties were, like
sovereign states, immune because, like states, they were sovereign
because the people delegated power to them through their con-
stitution.
The Supreme Court rejected Boulder's contention, observing
that "we are a nation of states, a principle that makes no accom-
modation for sovereign subdivisions of states." 5 The Court held
the Boulder ordinance subject to the antitrust laws, like the ordi-
nance of any non-home rule city would usually be.
The three dissenting justices were appropriately horrified.
Thundered Rehnquist: "[t]he Court's decision today will radically
alter the relationship between the states and their political
44. Id.
45. Id.
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subdivision. .-. . In order to defend itself.. . the home rule mu-
nicipality will have to cede its authority back to the states." '
Well, maybe and maybe not; it is possible to confine the Court's
opinion within the bounds of municipal liability for violation of our
federal antitrust laws, a rather specialized, arcane subject of in-
terest principally to municipal and antitrust lawyers.
On the other hand, it is at least suspicious that no less than
twenty-two states joined Colorado in filing "friend-of-the-court"
briefs against Boulder and its home rule claims. Whether this
represents, as the dissenting justices suggest, the state seizing an
"opportunity to recapture the power it has lost over local affairs" 7
remains to be seen. It is too early to bury our local governments
under the epitaph, sic transit home rule.
The primary implications for land use policy lie in the continued
struggle between many states and their local governments over
local land use control. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many
states took back some of the power to regulate land which it had
delegated to local governments by means of state enabling acts.4 8
This did not occur without resistance, and many local governments
have reasserted their authority, often through the vehicle of home
rule status. 9 If indeed home rule is about to die a slow death, then
the states will win the struggle for control over the regulation of
private land use.
Whether this is good or bad depends upon one's point of view.
Clearly many municipalities had used the power to zone for nar-
row, parochial, discriminating, damn-the-region purposes." On
the other hand, many more municipalities had not. Moreover, the
experience of regional and state land use control has been fraught
with complaints about insensitivity to local problems and unre-
sponsiveness to local citizens. The way to resolve what may be an
inherent state-local land use conflict is not to strip home rule cities
of their power and "return to the dark ages before home rule."'"
46. Id. at 851 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
47. Id. at n.7.
48. See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL (1971).
49. See C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING: THE ONCE AND FUTURE
FRONTIER (1979); Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited, 46 J.A. PLAN. A. 135
(1980).
50. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING (1973); THE USE OF
LAND (W. Reilly ed., 1974); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING
ISSUE (1973).
51. Freilich & Carlisle, The Community Communications Case: A Return to
the Dark Ages Before Home Rule, 14 URB. LAW. v. (Spring 1982).
III. The Taking/Compensation Issue:
After San Diego
The gradual erosion of Holmes' "regulatory taking" doctrine52 was
brought to an abrupt and unanticipated halt in early 1981 by the
strong dissent in San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego.3 There, it will be recalled, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking
for four of his brethren, declared not only that compensation was
due for regulatory takings, but set out just how he would measure
such compensation. 4 The public and private sectors have been
attempting to deal with the Supreme Court's language ever since.
A few courts have decided appeals based upon that dissent, with
predictable results. However, in most cases, the landowner is
appealing from the denial of a building permit on land once prop-
erly zoned for development, but for which a permit to build has
been denied for other reasons or a very recent rezoning has made
development all but impossible. Moreover, in most instances, the
owner has been left with virtually no use of the land in question.
Nowhere has the language of the San Diego dissent struck such a
responsive chord as in New Hampshire. Reinforcing its strong
property-rights protection stance, that state's supreme court in
June of 198111 set out both limits on the exercise of the police power
and, quoting extensively from the Brennan dissent, standards for
measuring landowner compensation where those limits are ex-
ceeded.
The case arose from municipal denial of a subdivision permit on
124 acres of recently-purchased, undeveloped woodlands in the
City of Keene. The owner, a real estate developer, purchased the
parcel in 1973 for $45,000 for residential development purposes.
At the time, it was zoned "rural," and such development was a
permitted use.56 Upon application for subdivision approval in
1975, the city planning board advised Burrows that it wished to
preserve the land for open space and to delay its application while
funds were obtained for the city to purchase the property, to which
Burrows agreed. However, the city's offer of $27,000 was inade-
52. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), discussed in detail in F.
BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 50. For a recent approach, J.
Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just Compensation Cases: Takings, Regula-
tion and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1982).
53. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
54. Discussed in detail in the 1981 report of the Land Use, Planning and
Zoning Committee, 13 URa. LAW. 723, 723-29 (1981).
55. Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981).
56. Id., 432 A.2d at 17.
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quate, and Burrows proceeded with his subdivision application,
which was formally denied in late 1976. The city then placed the
entire parcel in a "Conservation District" which permitted only
nonstructural uses of land. Litigation followed.57
On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered
essentially two issues:
1. Was the denial of subdivision approval a constitutionally
protected "taking" of property?
2. If so, was Burrows entitled to damages, or to declaratory
relief only?
The court based its determination on the first issue on the New
Hampshire Constitution which states that "no part. . . of a man's
property may be taken from him without his consent."58
The court's basic predilection is apparent from its opening salvo
on private property rights, in which it gratuitously misinterprets
500 years of English property law, and the Magna Carta in the
bargain:
The substantive issue raised in this case involves a principle that lies at the very
foundation of civilized society as we know it. The principle that no man's
property may be taken from him without just compensation reaches at least as
far back as 1215, when on "the meadow which is called Runnymede" the
Barons of England exacted from King John the Magna Carta, which contains at
least three references to this fundamental truth. 9
The court then recites the familiar Holfeldien definition of prop-
erty rights:
"Property," in the constitutional sense, is not the physical thing itself but is
rather the group of rights which the owner of the thing has with respect to it.
The term refers to a person's right to "possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing
and is not limited to the thing itself." The property owner's right of "indefinite
user (or of using indefinitely) ... necessarily includes the right..."to exclude
others from using the property, whether it be land or anything else. "From the
very nature of these rights of user and of exclusion, it is evident that they cannot
be materially abridged without, ipso facto, taking the owner's 'property'." Id.
"The principle must be the same whether the owner is wholly deprived of the
use of his land, or only partially deprived of it .... I
The court concludes that the "just compensation" requirement
applies to regulation, as well as physical taking, of property, quot-
ing the San Diego dissent:
57. Id., at 17-18.
58. Id., at 18.
59. Id., at 18. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 50, at ch.
5 & 6, for a thoroughly researched contrary view of Magna Carta and property law
through the United States' colonial period.
60. Id., 432 A.2d at 19 (citing cases).
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Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use restric-
tions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the
public good just as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of
property. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. at 1304
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 1
However, even in New Hampshire, not every regulation of prop-
erty results in a taking:
This is not to say that every regulation of private property through the police
power constitutes a taking. Reasonable regulations that prevent an owner from
using his land in such a way that it causes injury to others or deprives them of the
reasonable use of their land may not require compensation. Nor do reasonable
zoning regulations which restrict economic uses of property to different zones
and which do not substantially destroy the value of an individual piece of
property effect a taking requiring compensation. But arbitrary or unreasonable
restrictions which substantially deprive the owner of the "economically viable
use of his land" in order to benefit the public in some way constitute a taking
within the meaning of our New Hampshire Constitution requiring the payment
of just compensation. The owner need not be deprived of all valuable use of his
property. If the denial of use is substantial and is especially onerous, a taking
occurs. There can be no set test to determine when regulation goes too far and
becomes a taking. Each case must be determined under its own circumstances.
The purpose of the regulation is an element to be considered.62
Applying these criteria to the instant case, the court begins by
observing that it "does not come anywhere near the line dividing
constitutional and unconstitutional regulation. '63 In the court's
view-reasonable, certainly, from the facts-the city simply
wanted Burrows' land for open space, and when Burrows wouldn't
accept its price, it
... elected to accomplish its purpose by regulating the use of the property so as
to prohibit all "normal private development." It is plain that the city and its
officials were attempting to obtain for the public the benefit of having this land
remain undeveloped as open space without paying for that benefit in the
constitutional manner. The city sought to enjoy that public benefit by forcing
the plaintiffs to devote their land to a particular purpose and prohibiting all
other economically feasible uses of the land, thus placing the entire burden of
preserving the land as open space upon the plaintiffs. The trial court found, in a
well-considered opinion, that the uses permitted were "so restrictive as to be
economically impracticable, resulting in a substantial reduction in the value of
the land" and that they prevented a private owner from enjoying "any worth-
while rights or benefits in the land.'64
Turning to the compensation issue, the court first acknowledged
that the California court had denied compensation to landowners
in similar circumstances, relegating him to declaratory and man-
61. Id., at 19.
62. Id., at 19, 20 (emphasis added) (citing cases).
63. Id., at 21.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
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damus relief only, and rejected it "out of hand."65 It then adopted
the Brennan measure of damages for regulatory taking, lock, stock
and barrel:
We agree with Justice Brennan that it is always open to the governmental entity
involved to rescind or repeal the offending regulation and thus avoid payment
of damages for inverse condemnation from that point on. Id. at 1304-07. Until
that is done, however, the owner's property has been taken during the interim
period and he is entitled to compensation for that taking. Id. Limiting the
landowner to actions which only invalidate the offending regulation will en-
courage municipal planners and other public officials to attempt to throw the
burdens accompanying "progress" upon individual landowners rather than on
the public at large. The allowance of damages for inverse condemnation during
the period of the taking, however, should encourage such officials to stay well
on the constitutional side of the line, San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, supra at 1308 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and should also discourage
harassment of property owners by repeated amendments of zoning regulations
and the enactment of new ones. See id. at 1305-06 n.22.1
For good measure, the court threw in an invitation to sue the city
for civil rights violations under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act:
Planners and other officials should be aware of possible personal liability for
bad faith violations of a landowner's constitutional rights which may go beyond
the damages recoverable for inverse condemnation. Cities and towns should
also be aware of possible 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 actions for damages for violations
of the constitutional rights of citizens to be compensated for injuries suffered.
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673
(1980); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98
S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).
As we have said before, public officials have a duty to obey the constitution,
and they have no right or legitimate reason to attempt to spare the public the
cost of improving the public condition by thrusting that expense upon an
individual.... The greater the cost of accomplishing something which is consid-
ered to be in the public interest, the greater the reason why a single individual
should not be required to bear that burden.67
The Keene case is hardly your typical "difficult case" as far as
regulatory takings go. The city's history of attempting to acquire
the property for open space did little to convince the court that it
has a reasonable police power motive for prohibiting all structural
use. No floodplain or other natural limitation, here. It comes as
close as possible to the usually anecdotal zoning for park purposes.
65. Id., at 20.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added) (citing cases). See also Kraft v. Malone, 313 N.W.2d
758 (N.D. 1981), where refusal to grant a building permit for a single-family
residence in an area zoned for the purpose because the city wanted to retain the
drainage character of the property also amounted to a regulatory taking, for
which the city had to pay the fair market value of the lot in question.
Moreover, there is precious little economic use left on property
that was recently purchased, and expeditiously planned, for resi-
dential development by the owner. The case is thus distinguishable
from most "taking issue" cases and, by itself, probably does little
damage to recent notions of what constitutes a taking.68 However,
once such a taking is found, the New Hampshire court's blythe
acceptance of the Brennan dissent is more troublesome, and the
open invitation to file a Section 1983 action is positively chilling.
One suspects that the line between regulation and taking, in New
Hampshire at least, is about as far toward compensation for all but
the most traditional of zonings we have seen in at least a decade
from a state supreme court.
IV. The Army Corps of Engineers and
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act:
Coastal Protection with a Vengeance 9
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act7" autho-
rizes the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to regulate the dis-
charge of dredge and fill materials into the navigable waters of the
United States. As it is virtually impossible to remove such mate-
rials from a body of water without some of it falling back into the
water (technically a "discharge") and coupled with expanded defi-
nitions of navigability,7 the Corps' permitting authority thus ex-
tends to virtually every public or private development activity
which touches bodies of "navigable" waters. Moreover, regula-
tions and amendments to the act specifically subject wetlands to
the same Corps permit review (although the same amendments
also specifically exempt certain agricultural, silvicultural and simi-
lar activities from case-by-case review).
The potential land use implications, should the Corps vigorously
pursue its permitting authority, has been vastly expanded by a
68. See D. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HAST-
INGS CONST. L. Q. 491 (1981); D. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 28 (1981).
69. I am indebted to Trudy Senda, Associate Editor-in-Chief of the University
of Hawaii Law Review, and Robert Rowland, a student in the University of
Hawaii's Urban and Regional Studies Program, for permission to use their Land
Use Workshop paper on Regulating Hawaii's Wetlands in preparing this section of
the report.
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
71. Thanks largely to Natural Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.
Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) and the resulting regulations at 33 C.F.R.
§§ 209.120(d)(2)(i)(b) and (h) (1977).
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recent series of decisions from the United States Court of Claims.72
In Deltona Corp. v. United States,73 the court of claims upheld the
Corps' denial of a dredge and fill permit for the third phase of a
10,000-acre residential community on Florida's Gulf Coast. While
Deltona had obtained permits for its first two phases, the court
noted that the last application was made after the Corps' authority
had been substantially expanded. Thus, even though it had been
deprived of much of the use of this one large parcel, the court held
that "[D]eltona is no longer able to capitalize upon a reasonable
investment-backed expectation which it had every justification to
rely upon until the law began to change." The court noted that, in
response to Deltona's "taking" claim, it had developed three other
parcels, and could develop certain upland parcels without Corps
approval.
Of special interest was the court's citing with approval the new
Corps regulations which permitted it to withhold permits in the
event that dredge and fill activities would destroy historical and
aesthetic coastal values as well:
On April 4, 1974, the Corps published further revised regulations so as to:
(a) incorporate new permit programs under Section 404 of the FWPCA;
(b) incorporate the requirements of new federal legislation by adding to the
factors to be weighed in the public interest review, including: economies;
historic values; flood damage prevention; land-use classification; recreation;
water supply and water quality;
(c) adopt further criteria to be considered in the evaluation of each permit
application, including the desirability of using appropriate alternatives; the
extent and permanence of the beneficial and/or detrimental effects of the
proposed activity; and the cumulative effect of the activity when considered
in relation to other activities in the same general area;
(d) institute a full-fledged wetlands policy to protect wetlands subject to the
Corps' jurisdiction from unnecessary destruction."
To much the same effect is Jentzen v. United States76 and Lavey
v. United States."
V. Plans as Laws: Consistency Redux78
The relationship between plans and laws continues to trouble
citizens, councils and courts across the country. Should there be a
72. See infra notes 73, 76, & 77.
73. 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
74. Id. at 1191.
75. Id. at 1187-88.
76. 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
77. 661 F.2d 145 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
78. Much of this section is taken from the report of the subcommittee written
by Daniel W. O'Connell, its chairman.
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required consistency? 7 By 1981, fourteen states required con-
sistency between local land use plans and land use regulations. In
several other states, the courts have imposed their own consistency
requirements.'
A. California
Two appellate courts have addressed major plan issues. Camp v.
Mendocino County Board of Supervisors,8 is the first appellate
court decision which discusses inadequacies of certain mandatory
elements. Sierra Club v. Kern County Board of Supervisors82 held
that a precedent clause in a general land use plan element was void.
The court further stated that since the general plan was internally
inconsistent, "the zoning ordinance under review could not be
consistent with such plan and was invalid when passed."83
The court of appeals in Camp held the county did not have a
valid general plan because the land use, housing, noise and circula-
tion elements were not in substantial compliance with the specifi-
cations for such elements in the state law. Substantial compliance
"means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to
every reasonable objective of the statute as distinguished from
79. In spite of this continuing academic and professional debate on the role of
the local comprehensive plan in land use regulation, the "plan as law" movement
marches on. Numerous publications advocate a more serious role for the local
comprehensive plan:
1. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (adopted by the American Law Institute on May
21, 1975).
2. Housing for All Under Law: New Directions in Housing, Land Use and
Planning (1978 report of the American Bar Association Advisory Commit-
tee on Housing and Urban Growth).
3. The Practice of Local Government Planning (International City Manage-
ment Ass'n/American Planning Ass'n, 1979).
The ABA report contains numerous policy statements in favor of mandatory
planning and legal consistency, i.e.:
As the substantive and procedural elements of land-use decisions increase in
complexity and include new objectives such as environmental protection, lower
income housing needs, and regional growth management, comprehensive plan-
ning is essential as a policy base to insure internal consistency, to provide
predictability, and to reduce the tendency toward arbitrary local decision
making. State enabling legislation, traditionally permissive in its approach to
local planning, should be amended to require local comprehensive planning
and to require that the exercise of local land-use controls be consistent with
local comprehensive plans. (Policy No. 2, at 408).
80. Details of these requirements can be found in Netter & Vranicar, Linking
Plans and Regulations: Local Responses to Consistency Laws in California and
Florida, AMERICAN PLANNING ASS'N (PAS Report No. 363, 1981).
81. 123 Cal. App. 3d 334, 176 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1981).
82. 126 Cal. App. 3d 698, 179 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1981).
83. Id., 179 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (emphasis added).
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mere technical imperfections of form."" Indeed, as the court
observed, one wonders whether there was a plan at all:
It may be mentioned that the "plan" consists of a sheaf of uncoordinated
documents stuffed into an unlabelled carton. The trial court observed in one of
its memorandum decisions as follows: "Presented to the court with the repre-
sentation that it constituted the Mendocino County General Plan was a some-
what crumpled grey cardboard box ... containing an unassembled assortment
of papers and pamphlets variously identified ... [by titles and descrip-
tions] .... The physical composition of this "general plan" would appear to
make resort to it for planning information an awkward exercise and would also
seem to generate doubt concerning the integrity of the plan, when so many of its
elements are merely deposited loose in a cardboard box." We agree with these
comments.'
The Sierra Club case dealt with the following precedence clause:
If any conflict exists between the adopted open space and conservation ele-
ments and this land use element, this element should take precedence until the
open space and conservation can be reevaluated and amended, if necessary."
A rezoning from A-1 (light agricultural) to M-P and E-3 R-S
(mobile home and estate-suburban-residential) was consistent
with the maps of the land use element, but not with the open space
map. The trial court found the precedence clause made the general
plan internally consistent. The appellate court found such an inter-
pretation would frustrate the intent of the Open Space Lands Act"
because counties could simply subordinate the open space element
to other elements of the general plan. The real kicker is the
statement that "[Slince the general plan is internally inconsistent,
the zoning ordinance could not be consistent with such plan ...
and was invalid when passed. "u
This issue became moot when the precedence clause and incon-
sistencies were removed as to the area in question, but the problem
remained in other areas of the county. The court treated the matter
as an issue of broad public interest and therefore held the prece-
dence clause was void as not permitted under the appropriate
sections of the state law.
The California legislature is also considering major modifica-
tions to California's local plan requirements. A state planning law
task force, made up of members from the California Planners
Foundation, APA (California chapter), and the Office of Planning
84. 123 Cal. App. 3d 334, 176 Cal Rptr. 620 (1981).
85. Id.
86. 126 Cal. App. 3d 698, 179 Cal Rptr. 261 (1981) (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 264.
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and Research, has drafted proposed revisions to the state's plan-
ning law. Several major features of these revisions are:
a. A simplification of the general plan requirements, elimina-
tion of references to elements, elimination of overlapping
and excessive detail in descriptions of subjects which must be
covered. 9
b. The format of the general plan is left to local discretion.9'
c. Cities and counties are given maximum latitude in structur-
ing the planning function.91
d. Standards of judicial review are established for local plan-
ning and regulatory actions.
e. Additional guidance is provided on consistency in im-
plementing actions, including a definition of consistency and
list of actions which must be consistent with the general
plan.93
f. The inclusion of a requirement for a five year capital im-
provement program by all local agencies undertaking public
works projects."
g. A twelve-member state planning and development council is
created to prepare the report on goals and policies of state
interest and to identify and help resolve interagency con-
flicts.95
The draft also includes other revisions to existing laws covering
state, areawide and local planning. Because of limited time, the
task force did not propose revisions to the zoning statutes, the
Subdivision Map Act and other laws such as those governing
permit processing.' The task force intends to work on these stat-
utes in the future.
B. Colorado
The Supreme Court of Colorado addressed the plan issue in one of
three cases relating to the right of voters to subject rezoning
decisions to either initiative or referendum. In Margolis v. District
Court,' an amendment to the comprehensive plan of a statutory
89. § 65301-2.
90. § 65303.
91. § 65055-60.
92. § 65014.
93. § 65450-52.
94. § 6550-55.
95. § 65035-38.
96. AB 884.
97. 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981).
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city was also the subject of referendum petitions. The court held
that the right of referendum applies to rezonings, which for the
purpose of referendum and initiative, are to be considered legisla-
tive actions. However, the court held that a master plan is not
subject to referendum because the statutory plan is advisory only
and is not legislative in character.98
Similarly, in Concerned Citizens of Park County v. Board of
County Commissioners," the Colorado Court of Appeals held that
a county zoning resolution need not be preceded by the adoption
of a formal written comprehensive plan. Colorado statutes appli-
cable to counties, unlike those applicable to statutory municipali-
ties, omit the language "in accord with a comprehensive plan."
C. Florida
Many plans have been adopted since the Local Government Com-
prehensive Planning Act (LGCPA) °° was enacted in 1975. As of
July 1, 1981 (deadline for completion) 367 of 461 local govern-
ments (79.6 percent) had adopted complete comprehensive plans,
including 56 of 67 counties, 308 of 391 municipalities and all three
special districts.
Although most local governments have prepared comprehen-
sive plans, few have taken meaningful steps to implement them.
The state has no specific role in guiding the plan implementation
process, but has provided limited technical assistance through the
review of zoning and subdivision regulations for local govern-
ments. While several court decisions have dealt with plan issues,
they are not significant.10'
D. Hawaii
As noted in the 1981 report,"° Hawaii ties planning to zoning more
closely than any state in the union. However, for the third year in a
row, the state legislature failed to pass the twelve subject-specific 3
functional plans called for by Act 100,' ° the state plan which was
98. Id. at 305-06.
99. 636 P.2d 1338 (Colo Ct. App. 1981).
100. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163, 3161 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982).
101. See Arline, The Consistency Mandate of the Local Government Compre-
hensive Planning Act, 139 FLA. B.J. 661 (1981).
102. 13 URB. LAW. 723, 734-39 (1981).
103. Agriculture, conservation lands, energy, education, health, higher educa-
tion, historic preservation, housing, recreation, tourism, transportation and wa-
ter resources development.
104. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 226-1-105 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
written verbatim into Hawaii's statutes in 1978. If passed, the
twelve plans will be binding on all state agencies, including the
Land Use Commission which has the authority 5 to change the
boundaries of Hawaii's four statewide zoning districts."° Mean-
while, Hawaii's governor has "promulgated" the plans by
proclamation,"' making them binding on all state agencies for the
present.
The governor has also signed a plan for the development of a
large area just east of Honolulu's downtown area and west of its
huge Ala Moana Shopping Center (once the largest in the United
States). Developed at a cost of millions of dollars by the Hawaii
Community Development Authority,"° the plan takes precedence
over both Honolulu plans and zoning codes." The plan calls for
mixed-use development, primarily of a commercial nature, with
most development, primarily of a commercial nature, with most
development permitted only after a modified planned unit de-
velopment process."
Finally, the Honolulu City Council passed eight development
plans (complete with detailed maps) required by the city charter
which, once signed by the mayor, would take precedence over all
subsequent zoning code amendments and subdivision approvals."'
However, the mayor vetoed all of them, and only two were passed
by the council over her veto."2 Revision of the remaining six have
bogged down while the council and mayor argue over whether the
pending general plan revision for the county should precede any
further work on the development plans."3
E. Maryland
In Maryland, the decisions are split. In Kanfer v. Montgomery
County Council,"' the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reiter-
105. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-2 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
106. Agriculture, conservation, urban and rural. Ninety percent of Hawaii's
land is in the first two classifications. See STATE OF HAWAII, DATA BOOK 155 (1981).
107. May 3, 1982.
108. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 206E-2 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
109. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 206E-33 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
110. State of Hawaii, Hawaii Community Development Authority, Draft
Kakaako Community Development Plan at 1 (Nov. 2, 1981).
111. City and County of Honolulu, Revised Charter of the City and County of
Honolulu, Chap. 4, § 5-409 (1973).
112. Callies, Plans as Laws in Honolulu, 34 LAND USE L. AND ZONING DIG. 3
(1982).
113. For a detailed description of the plans, see last year's report, supra note
102.
114. 373 A.2d 5 (Md. App. 1977).
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ated the long-standing rule in Maryland that a master plan is at best
a "flexible guide" or an intellectual prophecy of future develop-
ment and is not entitled to the strong presumption of correctness
attaching to comprehensive zoning actions. However, in Board of
County Commissioners of Cecil County v. Gasler,"5 the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that the State Zoning Enabling Act requires
subdivision plans to be "consistent with the plan."
F. Montana
The Supreme Court of Montana in Little v. Board of County
Commissioners of Flathead County,116 strongly reinforced the mas-
ter plan requirements in Montana's State Planning Enabling Act:
Why have a plan if the local governmental units are free to ignore it at any time?
The statutes are clear enough to send the message that in reaching zoning
decisions, the local governmental unit should at least substantially comply with
the comprehensive plan (or master plan). This standard is flexible enough so
that the master plan would not have to be undergoing constant change. Yet,
this standard is sufficiently definite so that those charged with adhering to it will
know when there is an acceptable deviation, and when there is an unacceptable
deviation from the master plan ....
We are aware that changes in the master plan may well be dictated by changed
circumstances occurring after the adoption of the plan. If this is so, the correct
procedure is to amend the master plan rather than to erode the master plan by
simply refusing to adhere to its guidelines. If the local governing bodies cannot
cooperate to this end, the only alternative is to ask the legislature to change the
statutes governing planning and zoning.'
G. Oregon
The Oregon planning legislation, as overseen by 1000 Friends of
Oregon, provides one of the most sophisticated examples of the
plan as law. In 1973, Oregon established a statutory statewide
planning process whereby all state, city or county comprehensive
plans implementing ordinances and regulations were to be in con-
formity with to-be-adopted statewide goals within a year of the
goals' approval."8 The statewide goals were to be drawn up by a
Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) which
was also to review local plans and ordinances for compliance with
the goals."9
The LCDC adopted fourteen goals by 1974, and an additional
115. 401 A.2d 666 (Md. App. 1979).
116. 631 P.2d 1282 (Mont. 1981).
117. Id. at 1283.
118. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.225, 197.250 (1973 & Supp. 1981). See Morgan &
Shonkwiler, Statewide Land Use Planning In Oregon, 11 URB. LAW. 1, 1 (1979).
119. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.040 (1973 & Supp. 1981).
five in 1975, most of which are land use related. 2 ' They were
sufficiently controversial that a referendum to repeal the law was
held (and failed) in 1976,21 but the legislature imposed a morato-
rium on such goals in 1977."'
Oregon's system ties its land use plans and land use implementa-
tion regulations together very tightly. The "consistency" require-
ment is very strong. Each Oregon unit of local government pre-
pares and adopts a comprehensive plan which:
1. must be consistent with the statewide goals (but not neces-
sarily with their explanatory guidelines ... );13
2. must then be implemented by subdivision, zoning and other
land development regulations all within a year of the adop-
tion of the state goals and their explanatory guidelines. 124
It is apparently up to the counties to coordinate this consistency.
Whether a unit of local government is in compliance with these
consistency requirements can be determined through a compliance
acknowledgment procedure resulting in a compliance "order"
from the LCDC. Several dozen communities have received such
an acknowledgment from the LCDC. 25 The LCDC also hears
appeals on alleged goal violations by local governments.
The Oregon courts have been supportive of the statewide plan-
ning control system largely upholding the scheme in general. In
City of Sandy v. Board of Commissioners of Clackamas County,'26
the county took "exception" for a zone change on 26.5 acres to
allow a 90,000 square foot shopping center on rural agricultural
land. The site lies 1.5 miles from the City of Sandy urban growth
boundary and 4.0 miles from the City of Gresham boundary. The
county dismissed several alternative rural locations because they
were not currently planned and zoned for commercial use or were
too small for the proposed shopping center. The State Agricultural
Lands Goal (Goal 3) requires local governments and state agencies
"to preserve and maintain agricultural lands."'27 If a county wants
an "exception" from Goal 3, it must show that there are no
alternative locations that could accommodate the use without
120. Morgan & Shonkwiler, supra note 118, at 5; T. PELHAM, STATE LAND USE
PLANNING AND REGULATION (1979).
121. T. PELHAM, supra note 120, at 8.
122. Morgan & Shonkwiler, supra note 118, at 5.
123. Neuberger v. City of Portland, 288 Or. 155, 603 P.2d 771 (1979).
124. T. PELHAM, supra note 120, at ch. 7.
125. Id.
126. 3 LCDC 139 (1979), appeal dismissed; see also Carmel Estates, Inc. v.
Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 51 Or. App. 435, 625 P.2d 1367 (1981).
127. OAR 660-15-000 (1975).
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using rural agricultural land. The LCDC held that the "exception"
was invalid for failure to consider all reasonable alternatives, i.e.,
sites within Sandy and the Gresham urban growth boundaries,
sites otherwise suitable even if not currently zoned for that use,
and smaller sites which separately are able to accommodate the
types of retail uses found in a shopping center (supermarket, office
space, hardware, etc.).
A recent case on Goal 2, Land Use Planning, involved an
attempt to get an exception for industrial uses on agricultural
lands. In Eugene v. Lane County, 28 the Land Use Board of Appeal
held that "at a minimum, there must be a showing that the indus-
trial activity proposed is significantly dependent upon a unique site
specific resource located in the subject area."' 29
Goal 10, Housing, requires cities and counties to provide for the
housing needs of citizens of the state. LCDC has interpreted Goal
10 to incorporate the principles of "fair share" and "least cost"
housing. 3 ' In Stout v. Multnamah County, 3' the LCDC upheld a
county ordinance which did not allow mobile homes outright in
one or more zones. Although Goal 10 requires localities to allow
adequate numbers of affordable housing types outright, local gov-
ernments may select the means for achieving this. Multnamah
County had provided for a variety of multifamily housing types
instead of mobile homes.
H. Texas
Long the country's premier example of both "no zoning"
(Houston) 32 and "no planning," there is evidence that both may
soon change. Houston adopted a set-back ordinance in mid-1982,
ostensibly to ward off zoning itself. 33 Moreover, in City of Pharr v.
Tippitt," the Texas Supreme Court sent out a plea for more
attention to an expression of standards in land use decision-making
that both city officials and the courts can understand. Finally, in a
recent paper, Texas Supreme Court Justice Jack Pope suggests an
adopted comprehensive plan should provide these standards.
Several excerpts suggest a basis for major planning law changes in
Texas:
128. LUBA 80-050 (1981).
129. Id.
130. Seaman v. City of Durham, LCDC (No. 77-025) (1978).
131. LCDC (No. 79-037) (1981).
132. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 75 (1970).
133. 10 LAND USE PLANNING REP. 209, 213 (1982).
134. 616 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1981).
Good city planning, therefore, should precede the act of zoning. This is so
because it was originally legally intended that zoning should be "in accordance
with a comprehensive plan." It also makes sense that the skills in planning
would produce a better zoning product. There is, however, a much better
reason that the city plan should be carefully developed, studied, debated,
approved either formally or informally, and promulgated even though the
planning work will continually proceed....
A proposed change in zoning should focus upon the city plan and how and why
the plan historically arrived at its present formulation. Those resisting the
rezoning should be able to invoke the declared and inherent reasons for the
present plan. 35
Justice Pope would only give credibility to comprehensive plans
that reflect a legitimate attempt to address the present and future
needs of a city. He lists factors he would use as a judge in evaluat-
ing a particular plan: (1) Does the plan constitute a clear and
definite statement of policy? (2) Is the plan long-range? (3) Is the
plan comprehensive? (4) Is the plan general? (5) Is the plan a
product of public debate? (6) Is the plan implemented by the
council? (7) Is the plan amendable? 13 6
I. Washington
Washington continues to be a "plan as advisory guide" state. The
Supreme Court of Washington in Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview, etc.
v. Snohomish County,'37 rejected the argument that rezonings
must substantially comply with the existing comprehensive plans.
The court reiterated its position that the plan is only a general
blueprint and thus only general conformance is necessary. How-
ever, in this case the court concluded that the master plan and
zoning agreements did dovetail with the proposed development
plan.
In West Hill Citizens, etc. v. King County Council,38 the court of
appeals was faced with the approval of a preliminary plat with
density consistent with applicable zoning ordinances, but which
exceeded restrictions in the community plan. West Hill contended
that the more restrictive plan controls densities. The developer
and King County argued that zoning takes precedence over an
inconsistent comprehensive plan. The court used the following
language in the planning enabling act to reject plan supremacy:
135. The Decisionmaking Process by the City and the Courts will be published
in the 1982 Proceedings of the Institute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent
Domain (Southwestern Legal Foundation).
136. Id.
137. 96 Wash. 2d 201, 634 P.2d 853 (1981).
138. 29 Wash. App. 168, 627 P.2d 1002 (1981).
806 THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 14, No. 4 FALL 1982
LAND USE, PLANNING AND ZONING 807
[I]n no case shall the comprehensive plan, whether in its entirety or area by area
or subject by subject be considered to be other than in such form as to serve as a
guide to the later development and adoption of official control....
[T]he principle case upon which West Hill relies is Baker v. Milwaukee, 271 Or.
500,533 P.2d 772 (1975), which held that a comprehensive plan controlled over
a prior conflicting zoning ordinance .... However, the Washington Supreme
Court, without specifically naming Baker, has clearly rejected its rationale,
stating that "Oregon's statutory scheme substantially differs from Wash-
ington's."139
"Consistency" mandates, which make the plan the law, are
forcing a creative dialogue between planners and lawyers as they
invent or reinvent local comprehensive plans. However, if the plan
as law reform movement is to make substantial forward progress,
we must begin to shift urban planning into a more effective tran-
sitional stage, particularly as it relates to the function of "plan-
making."
VI. Growth Management"4
While not so trendy a topic as in the 1970s when the likes of Golden
v. Planning Board of Ramapo'41 and Construction Industry Asso-
ciation v. City of Petaluma'42 were decided, growth management
continues to be a critical issue in many states. Among the most
active are California, Florida, and Colorado, where population in
the past decade has boomed.
A. California
In 1978, a major blow was dealt to the financial resources of state
and local governmental agencies when Proposition 13 was ap-
proved by the voters. This amendment to the state constitution
severely restricted use of property taxes to finance expansion of
local government and required voter approval of new forms of
taxation. During the following two years, a major growth revolt
occurred throughout the state which resulted in the enactment of
numerous growth management plans by city and county govern-
ments, as well as by the initiative process."'
139. 627 P.2d 1002, 1004-05 (Wash. App. 1981).
140. Materials from this section come primarily from Subcommittee Chairman
David Anderson of Santa Barbara, California.
141. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
142. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
143. Examples of growth management by ordinance is City of Napa and
growth management by initiative is City of Thousand Oaks.
A very good summary of this growth management explosion is contained in the
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The reaction to this movement came in 1980 when the building
industry and other concerned groups convinced the state legisla-
ture that growth controls were preventing any reasonable response
to the need for "affordable" housing to meet the needs of new
arrivals and persons in the low- and moderate-income levels. The
legislature responded by enacting several new laws which attempt
to restrict the ability of local communities to limit growth. The
most important new legislation is found in the Government Code
which provides:
If a county or city, including a charter city, adopts or amends a mandatory
general plan element which operates to limit the number of housing units which
may be constructed on an annual basis, such adoption or amendment shall
contain findings which justify reducing the housing opportunities of the region.
The findings shall include all of the following:
(a) A description of the city's or county's appropriate share of the regional
need for housing.
(b) A description of the specific housing programs and activities being
undertaken by the local jurisdiction to fulfill the requirements of subdivi-
sion (c) of Section 65302 [the mandatory housing element requirements
of general plan legislation].
(c) A description of how the public health, safety, and welfare would be
promoted by such adoption or amendment.
(d) The fiscal and environmental resources available to the local
jurisdiction.'"
Other restrictions on growth management techniques were
adopted as part of the 1980 General Plan and Subdivision Map Act
amendments, and generally require that local communities plan
for and accommodate their "fair share" of regional growth and
housing needs.145
The issue of impact fees has also been a major issue in Califor-
nia. State legislation in California authorizes cities and counties to
require dedication of land or payment of in lieu fees by subdividers
for parks and recreational facilities' and school facilities;'47 reser-
vations of land within a subdivision for future parks, recreational
facilities, fire stations, libraries or other public uses; 48 land dedica-
tions for streets, bus turnouts, and bicycle paths;'49 fees for con-
report entitled, The Growth Revolt: Aftershock of Proposition 13? (August 1980)
(available from the State Office of Planning and Research, 1400 Tenth Street,
Sacramento, Cal. 95814).
144. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302.8 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981).
145. See CAL. Gov'T CODE, §§ 65863.6, 66412.2, 65580-65913.2, 65915 (West
1966 & Supp. 1981).
146. Id. at § 66477.
147. Id. at § 65970.
148. Id. at § 66479.
149. Id. at § 66475.
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struction of drainage channels, sanitary sewer facilities, ground
water recharge basins, bridges and major thoroughfares;"' and
dedications of solar access easements.' The use of impact fees and
land dedication requirements have been upheld by California
courts as valid uses of the police power and not "special taxes"
under the Proposition 13 restrictions.'52
B. Florida'
With the burgeoning growth throughout south and central Florida,
intense pressures have been placed on the financial capacity of
local governmental units to provide services to new residents.
Strongest pressures have been placed on the provision of water and
sewage facilities, schools, parks and roads. One mechanism a
number of local governments have turned to, or at least are con-
templating in order to ameliorate these financial burdens is the
impact fee. Similar to the mandatory dedication or in lieu fee
requirements found in some plat ordinances, the impact fee ordi-
nances being adopted in Florida constitute charges exacted against
new development in order to generate revenue for new capital
facilities demanded by that new development.
This local government activity has generated a fair amount of
litigation, for even though the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
concept of impact fees for water and sewage facilities,"' there have
been no definitive appellate court decisions after Dunedin address-
ing the legal viability of impact fees for roads, parks, school, and
other government services. It does, however, appear such deci-
sions will be forthcoming.
One case that has now made its way to the Fourth District Court
of Appeals, Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County,'55 challenges the
Broward County park impact fee provision. The ordinance, which
was upheld by the circuit court in Broward County, has been
appealed by the plaintiff. The appellate briefs have just been filed,
and a decision is at least several months away.
150. Id. at § 66483.
151. Id. at § 66475.3.
152. See Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170
Cal. Rptr. 658 (1981); Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 674 (1980).
153. This section is taken nearly verbatim from material submitted by F. Craig
Richardson of Boca Raton.
154. Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (1976).
155. Case No. 81-700.
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Another case that could make it into the appellate courts is
Homebuilders & Contractors Association v. Palm Beach County,'56
which challenges the Palm Beach County road impact fee ordi-
nance. The court upheld the road impact fee ordinance. The
decision has been appealed.
Because of the growing interest among local governments in
Florida with the concept, it would not be surprising to see other
cases emerging in the near future.
C. Colorado
Concerned about accelerated growth's effect on water supply and
wastewater disposal facilities, the Denver suburb of Westminster
adopted a growth management program which tied development
to available water and sewer service and "rationed" tap-ons and
connections to the area's developers.'57 The program was chal-
lenged by a developer whose predecessor had some contractual
arrangements with the city for water and sewer connections ex-
ceeding those allowed under the new program. The city's plan was
upheld,'58 on the ground that the city was under no obligation to
provide water and sewer service in any particular quantity or at any
set date.
VII. Development Rights'
A. Introduction
Since the pioneering work of John Costonis ten years ago, 16
"transfer of development rights" (TDRs) has enjoyed consider-
able vogue as a potentially creative tool in managing the use of
land. TDRs have been touted as the answer to preserving historic
156. Case No. 79-3281 CA (L) 01.
157. Kelly, Comment on Westminister Growth Control Cases, 34 LAND USE L.
& ZONING DIG. 15 (March 1982).
158. Colorado Inv. Servs., Inc. v. City of Westminster, 636 P.2d 1316 (Colo.
App. 1981).
159. This section is taken from materials submitted by Professor Richard D.
Lee of Temple Law School, with able assistance from Professor Linda Bozung of
Pepperdine. It appears here in a reduced form, much of it in the language of the
authors.
160. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Presevation of
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972), followed by Costonis, Develop-
ment Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973), and cul-
minating in J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT, LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE
MARKETPLACE (1974); see also Rose, A Proposalfor the Separation and Marketa-
bility of Development Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST.
L.J. 635 (1974).
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landmarks, guarding valuable farmland from encroaching de-
velopment, maintaining open space, and protecting environmen-
tally sensitive acreage.
Early litigation in New York added to the euphoria. Chief Judge
Breitel, for the New York Court of Appeals, in Fred F. French
Investment Co. v. City of New York,"' first recognized that de-
velopment rights are a component of the value of the underlying
property and hence potentially valuable as a transferable commod-
ity. This determination came, however, in a decision which upheld
the lower court's ruling declaring that TDRs did not provide
sufficient compensation for the rezoning of residential and office
building development property as public parks. The decision was
based on the dual grounds that: (1) no certain market existed for
the "floating" development rights, and therefore a deprivation of
economic value was effected; and (2) no reasonable use remained
for the property now zoned as a public park and therefore a
confiscation was effected. Chief Judge Breitel quickly adopted a
more favorable stance toward TDRs in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York,' 62 in which he ruled that TDRs could
provide reasonable compensation for the forced relinquishment of
development rights on a landmark site.
Planners, undaunted by these legal distinctions, were overjoyed
when the United States Supreme Court "approved" TDRs in
affirming Chief Judge Breitel in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York. 63 Actually, the Supreme Court merely held
that the New York Court of Appeals had found that the develop-
ment rights were valuable and hence could be included in the
computation to determine whether the landowner had any remain-
ing reasonable use for his property.' 6 Thus the New York case law
has set many of the legal standards by which TDRs are judged.
However, there are not many recent appellate cases which deal
directly with TDRs.
1. PENNSYLVANIA
In re Buckingham Developers, Inc.,65 involved an appeal of an
owner of farmland from a denial of a zoning variance to develop
161. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
162. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
163. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
164. Id. at 137. For more on the New York case law, see Modjeska Sign
Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 373 N.E.2d 255, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1977),
appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978) (distinguishing French from Penn Central).
165. 433 A.2d 931 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
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the land in a particular way. Under the local zoning ordinance,
TDRs were attached to the farmland. As one of several argu-
ments, the landowner asserted that the township could not deny
the variance sought on the theory that sale of the TDRs was an
alternative to developing the land. The court characterized the
theory as "novel" and wisely chose not to address it.
2. WASHINGTON
Louthan v. King County1" dealt with two suits seeking to block the
sale of general obligation bonds, the proceeds of which were to be
used to purchase development rights to certain property, notably
farmland, if the rights were voluntarily put up for sale. One plain-
tiff argued that the TDR plan was unnecessary because of the
substantial success of ongoing county efforts to preserve farmland
and open space. This being so, the use of bond money to purchase
TDRs was a gift of public funds contrary to the Washington Con-
stitution. The court disagreed, holding the TDRs were a valuable
property right which would serve as proper consideration for the
expenditure of state funds.
B. Local and Regional Ordinances
The passage of TDR ordinances, however, continues. Two Cali-
fornia jurisdiction ordinances are set out at some length, providing
as they do useful-and rare-insights on the complicated mechan-
ics of TDR.
1. CALIFORNIA
a. Malibu-Santa Monica. California Coastal Commission, South
Coast Region, has recently adopted Regional Interpretive Guide-
lines for the Malibu-Santa Monica Mountains area (June 18, 1981)
that contain provisions for a transfer development credit program.
These credits are to be used "as a method of mitigating the adverse
cumulative effects of new land divisions" in the coastal zone. The
Malibu-Santa Monica Mountains transfer development credit
program was heralded as one of, if not the, first transfer develop-
ment rights scheme adopted in California.
Under the California Coastal Act of 1976,167 cities and counties
were directed to formulate and adopt Local Coastal Programs
(LCP) to direct city and county development according to the
dictates of the Act. In the period of the formulation of the LCPs,
166. 94 Wash. 2d 422, 617 P.2d 977 (1980).
167. CAL. Gov'T CODE §831.5 (West 1966 & Supp. 1982).
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prior to their passage, the state commission retains permanent
control over development of the coastal areas and must issue
guidelines to facilitate that process for local governments and the
State and Regional Commissions. Basically, the task of formulat-
ing the necessary guidelines has been assigned to the Regional
Commissions.
The South Coast Regional Commission thus adopted Regional
Interim Guidelines that include a Transfer Development Credit
Program for the Santa Monica Mountains Region. The objective
of this scheme is to insure that construction in the interim period
prior to the approval of the LCP takes place only in those areas that
are able to support increased development on the basis of accessi-
bility of services, proximity to local employment centers, and
minimal destruction to coastal resources. The program specifies
special donor and receiver sites. Although construction is not
totally precluded on the donor sites, it is restricted to such an
extent as to be uneconomical in most instances. Thus the "volun-
tary" program is rendered somewhat involuntary in those cases
where it is not financially possible for a landowner to leave the
property undeveloped until the point in time when the LCP is
completed. In that instance, the owner will find it advantageous to
sell his development credit to a receiver to gain compensation.
The receiver must collect one right for each parcel that is created
through subdivision of an existing parcel and only conditional
approval of development is awarded until the "receiver owner"
has purchased the requisite amount of development credits. At
that point, the owner of the donor parcel must record an offer to
dedicate an Open Space or Scenic Easement over the subject lots
in favor of a public agency or private association approved by the
executive director of the commission. Although this recordation
does not sanction use of the property by the public, it does serve to
allow enforcement of the agreement to extinguish all development
potential. Uses of the property such as corrals, patios, or decks are
allowed if ancillary to another parcel that was not used to create a
development credit. The offer of dedication must be irrevocable
for twenty-one years.
Trade of the rights can only occur between a donor and receiver
that are both located within one of three designated zones. It is
believed that requiring exchanges to take place in geographic
proximity to one another minimizes the effects of development of
the nearby donor regions in the same zone. Receiver parcels are
usually located in already developed areas and approval of the
transfer credit will be contingent upon the satisfaction of three
conditions: the proposal and land division (1) must satisfy current
county zoning and map requirements; (2) must not require the
extension of roads or water services into rural areas; and (3) if not
within an existing developed area or approved expansion, the
parcels to be created must be no smaller than the average size of all
parcels lying wholly or partially within one-fourth mile of the
subject property.
The guidelines direct that the exchange of credit should take
place through the open market although the California Coastal
Conservancy and the Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy have
been involved in the buying and selling of credits to a limited
extent.
b. Transfer Development Rights Program: Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) also
instituted a Transfer Development Rights (TDR) Program in rec-
ognition that there was a need to provide some form of compensa-
tion for owners of parcels of property determined "unbuildable"
under the Section 208 Water Quality Plan. Although direct pur-
chase of lots "retired" from development was possible, TRPA
believed that formulation of the TDR Program would provide a
more effective means of mitigating the economic consequences to
property owners that would occur as a result of the plan.
The intense pressure for development on the California side
necessitated formulation of a rather rigid development criteria
structure. Lots are numbered one through seven (1-7) according
to their "buildability quotient," i.e., parcels numbered 1-3 are
considered high hazard and deemed not suitable for development
due to their location in stream beds or erosion areas. Construction
is permitted on lots numbered 4-7 with specific variations in per-
mitted ground coverage (maximal allowable coverage 30 percent),
Rights are distributed through a random allocation process (lot-
tery). Although all landowners may take part in the allocation
process, building is allowed only on those high capability lots (4-7)
and owners of high hazard lots (1-3) that draw building permits
must become TDR "suppliers." While the right to construct repre-
sented by the permit may be relinquished to TRPA by the land-
owners, in the hope that the 1983 plan may permit construction on
the high hazard lot, the customary disposal system for the permit
will be through the TDR program. A 4-7 lot (buildable) is the
receiver parcel for the development right gained through the
allocation process by lots numbered 1-3 (unbuildable). Upon
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transfer of the permit, owners of property in the 1-3 classification
must simultaneously relinquish all development rights to the land
either by deeding title to a nonprofit agency or by granting to the
city or county a permanent open space easement in the land. Such
an easement, while it does not place the land in the public domain,
guarantees that the land will forever remain, as open space (the
landowner retains limited uses such as camping).
This simultaneous relinquishment of all development rights by
the landowner to a public entity is an extremely critical element of
the TDR program, since the uncertain nature of zoning has in the
past often discouraged whole-hearted participation in such a pro-
gram by individuals who fear that later pressures on the gov-
ernmental body might force modification of present zoning restric-
tions that would thus diminish the value of the right received (for
the buyer) or the compensation gained (for the seller). By requir-
ing the grant of title or an easement, development is restricted
permanently irrespective of later zoning decisions by the legisla-
tive body. TRPA has, through this restriction, communicated to
the landowner that it is serious about enforcing and preserving the
present requirements.
Each TDR ordinance (there are three: City of Lake Tahoe-El
Dorado County, Placer County, and the California Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency) requires that building must occur within
three years after the purchase of the TDR. Construction may be
single family only due to restrictions on sewage and water capacity.
2. NEW JERSEY
The Development Ordinance of Chesterfield Township"6 allows
more intensive cluster development on parcels of at least 25 acres
by the simple device of having the developer deed other land (can
be noncontiguous to the township for open space, recreation,
school sites, agricultural, or other public use) or in the alternative
restrict by deed the other land to agricultural use in perpetuity.
However, since all land is treated as similar, the poorest land has
been offered for credit, rather than good agricultural land.
3. MARYLAND
a. Montgomery County. A series of 1981 articles in the Washing-
ton Post'69 spotlight some of the problems facing this county's TDR
168. N.J. REV. STAT. § 146 (West 1967 & Supp. 1982).
169. Maryland Weekly Section, Jan. 8, 1981, at 1; Maryland Weekly Section,
Mar. 5, 1981, at 1; Maryland Weekly Section, Mar. 12, 1981, at 1; Maryland
Weekly Section, Aug. 13, 1981, at 2.
ordinance. Local groups have opposed their areas being desig-
nated as receiving areas for TDRs from farmland elsewhere in the
county. Other groups are concerned that TDR sales will only
delay, not prevent, farmland development because the county
council is free to change its position in a few years. Some farmers
have gone to court to challenge, as an unconstitutional taking of
their property without just compensation, the designation of re-
ceiving areas for only 15,000 of the 88,000 acres in TDR sending
areas. A Development Rights Bank was proposed, but has yet to
be established. This bank would make loans against TDR collat-
eral, or, in certain cases, purchase TDRs directly. The county also
proposed to establish a development rights acquisition fund to
guarantee bank loans to developers who buy TDRs and also to buy
TDRs directly from farmers for eventual resale. This fund also has
not yet been established.
VIII. Interim Zoning and Moratoria'7°
The conflict between the use of the police power and the freedom
of the land owner to use real property to its highest and best use or
any other desired use arises most often in the context of pressure
for change. Viewing the evolution of the law on this facet of zoning
regulation, questions bf validity of governmental effort to stem the
flow of new development pending deliberations about proposed
new zoning constraints appear today to be decided by the applica-
tion of the same legal techniques and concepts as were used fifty
years ago. 71
When dealing with this subject various terms should be defined
to provide a common point of departure:
Interim Zoning: Regulation in the form of ordinance or resolu-
tion placing property in a zoning classification under which its
use is discouraged, or such that its permitted uses would not be
incompatible with new-proposals contained in the zoning ordi-
nance under consideration, or which would permit no form of
development which would be incompatible with the zoning ordi-
nance under consideration.
170. Materials for this report were submitted by Subcommittee Chairman and
Member of Section Council Robert Greenbaum of New Jersey.
171. Miller v. Board of Pub. Wks., 195 Cal. 477,234 P. 381 (1925) (necessity to
prevent harm to the environment), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927); Fowler
v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 7 S.W.2d 219 (1928) (accepted as an initial unit of a
comprehensive plan).
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Stopgap Zoning: Regulation which freezes the right to use land
to those uses presently permitted for the duration of the period
established by the regulation. At times, however, the term
"stopgap zoning" is used in a sense synonymous with "interim
zoning."
Moratorium: Regulation more frequently related to a halt or
freeze in the permit process but used to describe ordinances or
resolutions which bar all use approvals for the time period
established in the regulation. 17
2
These definitions are an attempt to bring some rationality and
consistency to an area where courts have come to wildly disparate
results. This sense of chaos pervades the cases from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and at times there can be no reconciling cases within
the same jurisdiction. 7 1 Courts do not agree on the definitions
given. Therefore, every case must be carefully reviewed since the
labels are virtually meaningless. Results do not often depend on
definitions.
The reports of recent litigation in the never ending tension
between developer and regulatory authority bring an unmistak-
able air of deja vu. Interim regulation adopted without authority of
specific enabling legislation may, depending upon happenstance of
forum, have opposite results." '
A typical judicial approach is that of an appellate court in New
Jersey when responding to an argument that sought to strike a
regulation characterized as a moratorium while distinguishing such
172. A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, § 11.01 (4th ed. 1981).
173. Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 308 Minn. 52, 245 N.W.2d 819 (1976);
Ostrand v. Village of North St. Paul, 275 Minn. 440,147 N.W.2d 571 (1966); Deal
Gardens, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 48 N.J. 492, 226 A.2d 607 (1967); Board of
Supervisors v. Home, 216 Va. 113, 215 S.E.2d 453 (1975); Bennett T. Matthews
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 218 Va. 270, 237 S.E.2d 128 (1977); State ex rel.
Randall v. Snohomish County, 488 P.2d 511 (Wash. Sup. 1971); Smith v. Skagit
County, 453 P.2d 832 (Wash. Sup. 1969); Schrader v. Guilford Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 418 A.2d 93 (Conn. 1980).
The research path followed a predictable route with valuable reference having
been made to the following sources which are commended to any colleague with
interest in the law on this subject: A. RATHKOPF supra note 172; N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW (1974, with Cumulative Supplement 1981); 82
Am. Jr. 2d, paragraph 72-74; Annot., 30 A.L.R. 3d 1190.
174. Thus, regulation was upheld as being within the scope of implied power in
general enabling legislation notwithstanding the absence of express statutory
authority, Collura v. Town of Arlington ex rel. 367 Mass. 881 (Sup. Jud. Ct.
1975), while similar regulation was held to be void because it was not within the
scope of enabling legislation. State ex rel. Holiday Park, Inc. v. City of Columbia,
479 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1972).
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regulation from interim or stopgap zoning which had earlier been
upheld:
Plaintiff argues that these cases involved "interim" or "stop gap" zoning and
not a moratorium. While this is true, we believe that the distinction is without
legal difference. It is clear that the purpose of interim zoning, as approved by
our courts, is to halt development in certain uses temporarily until enactment of
a new comprehensive zoning ordinance. That is precisely the purpose of the
enactment challenged here and the power to promulgate such a temporary
measure is "within the intent and purpose of the statutes relating to
planning."17
Perhaps the case most illustrative of the quandry and the
rationale of solution is Almquist v. Town of Marshan. 7 6 There,
plaintiff-property owner sought to develop lots from a portion of
his farm acreage as was at the time permitted under the township
zoning regulations. After substantial delay the authorities did not
act on plaintiff's application but instead introduced a moratorium
ordinance of six months duration. The Minnesota zoning enabling
statute contained no express authority for this action, although
legislation applicable to counties did so. In upholding the regula-
tion the court laid down criteria for the validity of a moratorium
which it held was within the implied powers of the local authorities
under the general enabling statute. The specific holding was that a
moratorium on the issuance of permits (and presumably on prop-
erty uses otherwise permitted by ordinance) is valid if (a) it is
adopted in good faith; (b) it is not discriminatory; (c) it is of
limited duration; (d) it has for its purpose the development of a
comprehensive plan; and (e) the town board acts promptly to
adopt such plan.
Of course, the difficulty with Almquist is that in each case the
applicant is relegated to a trial of an issue of fact with respect to
each of the court's stated criteria for the validity of a moratorium.
Query: whether public policy is better served by a statute clearly
branding unacceptable a moratorium on development but permit-
ting a "reasonable interim zoning ordinance" with suitable con-
straints as to time and requirement of parallel action toward new or
substantially revised regulations.177
Unlike the dynamic and burgeoning area of zoning law gener-
ally, the question of interim zoning and moratoria does not appear
175. New Jersey Shore Builders Ass'n v. Township of Ocean, 128 N.J. Super.
135, 319 A.2d 255 (1974). This, of course, preceded adoption of New Jersey's
Municipal Land Use Law, infra note 177.
176. 245 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 1976).
177. New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law, Ch. 291, Laws of N.J. 1975, as
amended § 77 (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:55D-90 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982)) is
verbatim:
VOL. 14, No. 4 FALL 1982
LAND USE, PLANNING AND ZONING
far advanced today beyond the concepts initially articulated in the
earlier cases which appear in the treatises cited in this report.
There has, however, been a steady growth in the body of statutory
enactments where through enabling legislation or other statutory
enactments the courts have received guidance from the legis-
latures. "I
Interim zoning, then, is to be tested on the same basis as all
zoning regulations, i.e., (a) authority, either expressed or im-
plied; and (b) validity, either on the basis of compliance with
technical requirements for enactment or on the basis of general
constitutional principles of substantive due process and equal pro-
tection.
IX. Transportation and Land Use:
Zoning for Mass Transit in Atlanta
On January 1, 1982, a new zoning ordinance became effective for
the City of Atlanta, Georgia, 179 which significantly restructured the
C. 40:55D-90 Moratoriums; interim zoning.
a. The prohibition of development in order to prepare a master plan and
development regulations is prohibited.
b. A municipality may adopt a reasonable interim zoning ordinance not
related to the land use plan element of the municipal master plan without
special vote as required pursuant to subsection 49 a. (C. 40:55D-62a.) of this
act, pending the adoption of a new or substantially revised master plan or new
or substantially revised development regulations. Such interim zoning ordi-
nance shall not be valid for a period longer than one year unless extended by
ordinance for a period no longer than an additional year for good cause and
upon the exercise of diligence in the preparation of a master plan, development
regulations or substantial revisions thereto, as the case may be: ....
178. This compilation is made from notes and text in A. RATHKOPF, supra note
172, and N. WILLIAMS, supra note 173, and as reported by colleagues on the
Subcommittee:
California-CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65858 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981).
Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-2-20 (1973).
Kentucky-1979 Ky. REV. STAT. & R. SERV. 100-350(9) (Baldwin 1977).
Michigan-MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 5.2963(15) (Callaghan 1976 & Supp. 1982).
Minnesota-MINN. STAT. ANN. § 394.34 (West 1968 & Supp. 1982).
New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-90 (West 1967 & Supp. 1982).
North Dakota-No Citation.
Oregon-OR. REV. STAT. § 215.104 (1955).
South Dakota-S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 11-2-10, 11-4-3.1 (1967 Supp.
1981).
Utah-No Citation.
Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4410 (1975 & Supp. 1981).
Virginia-No Citation.
Washington-WASH. REV. CODE § 36-70-790 (1964 & Supp. 1982).
Wisconsin-WIs. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(7b) (West 1957 & Supp. 1982).
Wyoming-Wvo. STAT. § 18-5-20 (1977).
179. This section is written from a report supplied by Jay J. Levin of Atlanta,
and appears here in lightly edited form.
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public policies and controls for development of the central busi-
ness district of downtown Atlanta.'8°
The 1982 Zoning Ordinance marks a significant departure from
existing laws in three essential areas: (a) the utilization of Floor
Area Ratios (FAR)18" ' and Land Use Intensity formulae (LUI)H as
basic development criteria; (b) the adoption of strict parking limi-
tations; and (c) the recognition of, and actual creation of, Special
Public Interest Districts.'83 A major factor in the new approaches
contained in the 1982 Zoning Ordinance was the systematic
attempt to focus future development around major rail rapid tran-
sit stations and facilities which were under construction and which
first opened for passenger service in 1978.
Created by statute and implemented and funded as a joint public
instrumentality of local governments by intergovernmental con-
tract in 1971,14 Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
(MARTA) has designed and constructed nine rail rapid transit
stations within or adjacent to the central business district of down-
town Atlanta.'85 Three of these stations opened for passenger
180. City of Atlanta Zoning Ordinance, Art. 16 (adopted December 15, 1980;
effective January 1, 1982) [hereinafter referred to as 1982 Zoning Ordinance].
181. The 1982 Zoning Ordinance defines the Floor Area Ratio as follows:
The sum of the gross horizontal area of the several floors of a building measured
from the exterior faces of the exterior walls or from the centerline of walls
separating two buildings, but not including attic space with headroom of less
than seven (7) feet, floor area six (6) feet or more below grade, uncovered steps
or fire escapes, accessory water or cooling towers, or accessory off-street
parking or loading areas.
Atlanta 1982 Zoning Ordinance, supra note 180, § 16-29.001 (13).
182. A Land Use Intensity (LUI) system has been defined by Research Atlan-
ta, an independent nonprofit public policy organization, as a "method for regulat-
ing multi-family dwelling development by density (FAR) and the provision of
open space rather than the [traditional] method of specifying the maximum
number of units per acre." See RESEARCH ATLANTA, ATLANTA'S PROPOSED ZONING
ORDINANCE: AN ANALYSIS (1978) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH ATLANTA
ZONING STUDY]. The Land Use Intensity Ratios are set forth as Table I in
§ 16-08.007 of the Atlanta Zoning Ordinance.
183. See 1982 Zoning Ordinance, supra note 180, ch. 18, 18A, 18B, 18C and
18D.
184. MARTA was created by the Georgia General Assembly in 1965, 1965
GA. LAWS, § 2243, as amended, following the enabling authorization of a local
constitutional amendment. GA. CONST. 1945, art. XVII, § I, para. I-V, as con-
tinued in force by virtue of GA. CONST. 1976, art. XIII, § I, para. II. A Rapid
Transit Contract and Assistance Agreement was entered into, as of September 1,
1971, by MARTA, the City of Atlanta, and Fulton, DeKalb, Clayton, and
Gwinnett Counties. In accordance with referenda requirements, this Contract
became binding upon only MARTA, the City of Atlanta, and Fulton and DeKalb
Counties.
185. These nine transit stations consist of the Five Points Station (the hub
station), the Omni and Georgia State Stations on the East-West line, and the
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service in 1978, and three additional stations opened in 1981. The
remaining three stations are scheduled to open for revenue service
in late 1982.
Commencing with the very first drafts of the 1982 Zoning Ordi-
nance which were prepared in 1974, a fundamental decision was
made to tailor the new zoning requirements to the anticipated
impact of these rail rapid transit stations on area development.
Such potential impact was carefully considered in two separate
studies: (a) a Comprehensive Development Plan of the City of
Atlanta,' 86 and (b) Transit Station Area Development Studies
(TSADS).'87 Comprehensive transportation planning for metro-
politan Atlanta was also mandated by federal regulations and by
the Georgia General Assembly and is embodied in the Regional
Transportation Plan 1978-2000. 88 The 1982 Zoning Ordinance was
intended to facilitate and implement the development goals and
guidelines set forth in the Comprehensive Development Plan, and
was based in large part on the express assumption that areas
adjacent to rapid transit stations would be among the most desir-
able development locations in the City of Atlanta. 18 9
The 1982 Zoning Ordinance addresses the potential impact of
rapid transit stations on area development by authorizing and
specifically creating four special public interest districts around key
MARTA stations. The intent for these districts, as expressed in the
1982 Zoning Ordinance, is to permit creation of such districts:
(a) in general areas officially designated as having special and substantial
public interest in protection of existing or proposed character, or of principal
views of, from, or through such areas;
(b) surrounding individual buildings or grounds where there is special and
substantial public interest in protecting such buildings and their visual en-
vironment; or
Garnett, Peachtree Center, Civic Center, North Avenue, Midtown, and Arts
Center Station on the North-South line.
186. Prepared by the Mayor and adopted by the City Council in accordance
with Atlanta City Charter Section 3-061, Comprehensive Development Plans
have been adopted by City of Atlanta on an annual basis since 1975.
187. Transit Station Area Development Studies were prepared for each pro-
posed MARTA station during the period from 1972-1975 by the Atlanta Re-
gional Commission.
188. A Regional Development Plan and this Regional Transportation Plan
have been prepared by the Atlanta Regional Commission since 1975, with
periodic updates.
189. See, e.g., ATLANTA REGIONAL COMM'N, SELECTED VALUE CAPTURE
OPPORTUNITIES RELATED TO THE RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM IN METROPOLITAN
ATLANTA (1978); Callies, A Hypothetical Case: Value Capture/Joint Develop-
ment Techniques to Reduce the Public Costs of Public Improvements, 16 URB. L.
ANN. 155 (1979).
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(c) in other cases where special and substantial public interest requires mod-
ification of existing zoning regulations, or repeal and replacement of such
regulations, for the accomplishment of special public purposes for which the
district was established.
It is further intended that such districts and the regulations established
therein shall be in accord with and promote the purposes set forth in the
Comprehensive Development Plan and other officially adopted plans of the
city in accordance with the Comprehensive Development Plan, and shall
encourage land use and development in substantial accord with the physical
design set forth therein.'"
Initial drafts of the 1982 Zoning Ordinance specifically referred
to these districts as "MARTA Special Public Interest Districts"
and proposed that five such districts be created on the theory that:
There is special and substantial public interest in controlling development
within and adjoining MARTA corridors in such a way as to assure appropriate
patterns of land use, location and bulk of buildings, intensity of development,
provision for open space, protection of public safety, promotion of public
convenience, and preservation of desirable characteristics of existing neighbor-
hoods within and adjacent to the corridor.'91
In response to criticisms and substitute proposals, the final text
of the 1982 Zoning Ordinance was revised to reduce the number of
such districts to four and to delete the express reference to
MARTA Districts by identifying them solely as Special Public
Interest Districts.'92 These four Special Public Interest Districts are
identified as SPI-1 Central Core District, SPI-2 North Avenue
District, SPI-3 Midtown District, and SPI-4 Arts Center
District.'93
Each of these SPI Districts modifies the otherwise applicable
development controls in three basic categories: floor area ratio,
maximum building coverage limitation, and public space require-
ments.
In each SPI District, a higher Floor Area Ratio (FAR) is permit-
ted than in the immediately adjacent zoning district. 94
190. 1982 Zoning Ordinance, supra note 180, § 16-18.001.
191. RESEARCH ATLANTA ZONING STUDY, supra note 182, at 31.
192. Id. at 42-81.
193. 1982 Zoning Ordinance, supra note 180, Ch. 18A, 18B, 18C and 18D.
194. FAR Limitations:
C-4 Central Area Commercial- (7) x (net lot area)
Residential District (nonresidential)
(3.2) x (gross lot area)
(residential)
C-5 Central Business (10) x (net lot area)
Support District (nonresidential)
(3.2) x (gross lot area)
(residential)
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To the extent that a much higher FAR is permitted within these
districts, the goal is to encourage the development of high intensity
housing within multiuse complexes or independent structures
adjacent to MARTA stations located in such districts.'95
Similarly, the maximum building coverage limitations range
from a 90 percent of net lot area in SPI-1 to 75 percent of net lot
area in SPI-4, while the adjacent areas are restricted to 80-85
percent of net lot area.
The public space requirement which is an added factor in the SPI
Districts essentially requires that a certain percentage of the net lot
area of nonresidential and mixed use developments be set aside as
''spaces appropriately improved for pedestrian amenity or for
aesthetic appeal," including areas accessible to the general public
such as malls, galleries, atria, lobbies, plazas, terraces and
walkways. I" The public space requirements for the SPI range from
15 percent at SPI-1 to 50 percent at SPI-4.
Since the 1982 Zoning Ordinance has been effective only for a
matter of months, the success of the Special Public Interest Dis-
tricts in achieving the desired goals remains to be seen. Nonethe-
less, these new regulations are significant for future public controls
on development in affirmatively recognizing the relationships be-
tween mass transportation facilities and commercial and residen-
tial development adjacent to such facilities. By providing incen-
tives for more extensive forms of development proximate to transit
stations, the 1982 Zoning Ordinance will serve both to guide the
form and location of development within the Central Business
District of Atlanta and to foster increased use of mass transporta-
SPI-1 (Central Core (25) x (net lot area)
District) (nonresidential)
(3.2) x (gross lot area)
(residential)
SPI-2 (North Avenue (12) x (net lot area)
District) (nonresidential)
(6.4) x (gross lot area)
(residential
SPI-3 (Midtown District) (10) x (net lot area)
(nonresidential)
(6.4) x (gross lot area)
(residential)
SPI-4 (Arts Center (8) x (net lot area)
District) (nonresidential)
(6.4) x (gross lot area)
(residential)
195. See, e.g., 1982 Zoning Ordinance, supra note 180, § 16-18D.002(3).
196. Id. at § 16-28.012(2).
tion facilities. While not directly tied to a tax increment or value
capture policy,'9 7 the 1982 Zoning Ordinance will necessarily begin
to achieve more directly the benefits of correlating the massive
public investments in mass transportation projects with private
investments in commercial and multiuse developments.
X. Housing and Open Space Innovations'"
One of the principal issues in providing housing for low-income
families in developing areas is whether such housing can be made a
requirement for the private development of land, much as the
provision of infrastructure and open space has become a common
prerequisite for residential subdivisions in many parts of the
country.1" The methods of including a low-income housing ele-
ment have, been grouped under the inaccurate rubric, "inclusion-
ary zoning."2I While there is virtually no case law supporting such
inclusionary schemes as a requirement for land development (in-
deed, the only state supreme court decision on point struck down
such a provision,2"1 and most that have been upheld provide incen-
tives and bonuses for such housing increments, rather than make
them as a permit requirement), nevertheless a number of com-
munities have commenced work on such inclusionary measures,
especially at the local level.2 What follows is an analysis of two
recent programs in California, at least one of which abandons the
"bonus" approach and makes the low-income housing element a
development condition. Predictably, it has been challenged in
court.
A. Santa Monica, California
Santa Monica, a city of 100,000 people, borders 2.9 miles of Pacific
beachfront near Los Angeles. High on the cliffs overlooking the
ocean are some of the most expensive homes in the country. Along
197. See, e.g., supra note 189.
198. This section was written in part from materials supplied by Anita Miller,
Assistant City Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
199. Upheld under various theories in California-Associated Homebuilders
v. Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); Illinois-
Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 22 111. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961); New York-Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218
N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
200. Inaccurate because zoning is rarely involved. For full discussion, see last
year's annual report, at 13 URB. LAW. 723, 754-55 (1981).
201. Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters. 198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973).
202. Hawaii, Colorado, California.
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the beachfront are high income condominium developments. The
city also contains an extraordinarily high number of rental units.
A coalition which supported a successful rent control initiative
in 1979 gained control of the Santa Monica City Council in April,
1981, and immediately began to prepare a revised housing ele-
ment, in keeping with the requirements of California's State Gov-
ernment Code.2 3 The new council majority intended to assure that
Santa Monica met the existing and projected housing needs of its
residents, as well as its fair share of regional responsibility for
decent, affordable housing for all social groups. A citizens' advis-
ory committee and a task force, composed largely of supporters of
the new council drafted proposals which, in seeking to meet goals
of achieving local and regional housing needs, had serious implica-
tions for institutional and commercial property owners in the
region, and promised to revolutionize land use, planning, and
zoning.
First, the council placed a moratorium on all development,
pending the drafting of a new housing element and zoning
ordinance.2 ' Then in June 1981, the citizens' advisory committee,
appointed by the new council, released its "proposed housing
element" to promote the policy of "inclusionary zoning." It would
provide that 30 percent of controlled rental units at each property
should be affordable to persons with incomes at or below 120
percent of county median income. 25 To promote the full use of
existing housing, the policies, among other things, discourage the
withholding of rental units from the rental market, and encour-
aged the sharing of housing.2 6 Other policies encourage conver-
sion of existing housing into limited equity cooperatives and the
lease of municipally assisted housing to tenant cooperatives for
their operation.27
Incentives are created for the development of housing in com-
mercial and manufacturing zones. In all such zones not permitting
housing as a matter of right, zoning would be made cumulative to
allow housing as a conditional use, which would be allowed unless
clearly contrary to public health, safety, and welfare.2 8
203. CAL. GOV'T CODE, § 65302(C) (West 1954 and Supp. 1981).
204. Interview with Jonathan Horne, Deputy City Attorney, City of Santa
Monica (Dec. 15, 1981).
205. Proposed Housing Element, Section 1. Policy Report prepared by the
Santa Monica Citizens Advisory Committee for the Revision of the Housing
Element, at p. 12 (June 1981).
206. Id. at 12-28.
207. Id. at 30.
208. Id.
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In order to maintain and increase the supply of affordable hous-
ing, the inclusionary zoning program would apply to all market
rate housing, whether resulting from new construction, substantial
remodeling, or conversion of apartment units. "Market rate"
housing is housing affordable only to persons with incomes over
120 percent of the county median. Units were to be provided on
site, including sites in commercial and industrial areas.2 0 If the city
determined that provision of an on-site unit would deter otherwise
desirable commercial or industrial development, as in the case of
small commercial or industrial projects, off-site units could be
provided or an "in lieu" fee could be imposed instead. Further-
more, any market rate housing project which results in the removal
of "affordable" units is required to provide for the replacement of
such units. Any provision of inclusionary units would be main-
tained as affordable units through the use of deed restrictions and
by regulation. 10
On August 11, 1981, the city council directed the city attorney to
prepare an ordinance lifting the emergency building moratorium
and establishing interim permit procedures. Permits can only be
granted to developments meeting the inclusionary policies set
forth above (with a few exceptions).2 " Developers, property own-
ers, and contractors are currently challenging the moratorium and
interim guidelines at the district court level.
B. Monterey, California
On July 8, 1981, the City Council of City of Monterey, California,
passed an ordinance in furtherance of a policy to actively pro-
mote voluntary private efforts to develop moderate income hous-
ing in the community. The city established a policy that all private
developers of housing of ten or more units, including division of
property for residential purposes, shall contribute to the city hous-
ing goal for moderate income housing. In order to encourage
developer participation, the city offers incentives, which may in-
clude nongeneral fund subsidies, mortgage revenue bonds, waiv-
ers of requirements in density increases, or other such incentives.
The ordinance defines moderate income housing as housing
affordable to households earning 80 percent to 120 percent of the
209. Id. at 26-48.
210. Id. at 26-48.
211. Staff Report, Ordinance Lifting Moratorium and Establishing Interim
Permit Procedures (August 25, 1981).
212. Ordinance No. 2416 C.S., City of Monterey (July 21, 1981).
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county median income, adjusted for family size. The ordinance
assumes that moderate income housing can be rented for 25 per-
cent or less of the family's monthly gross income, or alternatively,
purchased with payments of 33 percent or less of the family's
monthly gross income. The moderate income housing contem-
plated includes single family homes, condominiums, apartments,
mobile or modular homes, dormitories, or other types which meet
relevant city standards. The ordinance defines low income housing
as housing affordable to households which earn 0-80 percent of
the Monterey County median income, adjusted for family size, as
specified in current United States or California census data or
other similarly required current data. It is assumed that low in-
come housing can be rented for 25 percent or less of the family's
monthly gross income, or alternatively purchased with payments
of 33 percent or less of the family's monthly gross income."'
Developers of ten or more housing units must provide at least 15
percent of their project for moderate income households, or,
alternatively, provide an approved developer housing program to
the city promoting the city goal that at least 15 percent of all new
housing be affordable to moderate income households. That pro-
gram must contain the proposed technique or combination of
techniques to meet the equivalent of the city's moderate income
housing goal."1 '
Affordable units must be developed on site unless they are
placed elsewhere within the City of Monterey or its sphere of
influence. A developer may choose to produce low income housing
instead of moderate income housing. In such a case, the city may
choose to increase the level of incentives. Furthermore, if a de-
veloper provides land or funds in lieu of producing housing, the
city or other housing sponsor may choose to use these resources to
produce low or moderate income housing."'
Prior to obtaining building permits, the developer must assure
the city that all housing units in the program will be sold or rented
to city certified moderate income households, and that these units
will be concurrently constructed with or prior to upper and middle
income units in the project, unless this requirement is waived by
the city council. The ordinance states that the moderate or low
income units need not have the same level of amenities or market
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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value as the upper and middle income units at the project, unless
specifically required by the city." 6
The program gives preference for low or moderate income units
to persons who live or work within the City of Monterey, but
requires that there be no discrimination on the basis of race, creed,
or religion. Housing developed for low or moderate income house-
holds must continue to be affordable to them from the date of
initial occupancy, or it must be replaced by affordable low or
moderate income housing elsewhere. The developer must include
guarantees that the property will remain low or moderate income
housing or be replaced in kind. The ordinance suggests that, in
meeting this requirement, the developer use such devices as deed
restrictions, wraparound financing, land sales contracts, first right
of refusal vested in the city, and other similar devices.
XI. Section 1983 and Land Use Control2 17
Building upon last year's report's brief discussion"8 of Monell v.
The Department of Social Services, 9 Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence22 ° and Maine v. Thiboutot,"' this section summarizes
leading recent section 1983 cases from the hundreds which have
been filed around the country in the past two years which deal with
the use of land. Basically, the cases reinforce last year's conclu-
sions that:
1. Purposeful discrimination or knowing or reckless or willful
conduct equivalent to purposeful discrimination states a
cause of action under section 1983. The cases which fail are
those which do not prove that such conduct has occurred.
2. The damages standard, upon successful suit, appears to be
that set forth in the Brennan dissent and followed in the
Keene case.
3. Choice of forum, for a variety of procedural and substantive
reasons, remains a major factor for the practicing lawyer.
Hernandez v. City of Lafayette2 is probably the most important
216. Id.
217. This section is an edited and shortened version of a report submitted by
John Armentano of Mineola, New York.
218. 13 URB. LAW 723, 761 (1981).
219. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
220. 445 U.S. 662 (1980).
221. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
222. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 649 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1981)
cert. denied -U.S. , 102 S. Ct. 1251 (1982).
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case to have been decided in this area. A landowner instituted a
civil rights action against the city and its mayor alleging that the
city, through its zoning ordinance and in its failure to rezone his
land, had deprived him of property without due process and with-
out just compensation. The court of appeals held that the mayor,
in vetoing the ordinance passed by the city's legislative body, was
performing a legislative function and was thus entitled to absolute
immunity from civil suit. However, the city itself was not entitled
to legislative immunity from damages in connection with its zoning
regulation.
This case reviews the entire area of civil rights litigation. It also
discusses the application of Agins v. City of Tiburon,223 Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. City of New York.2 1 Most critically, the
court sets forth very clearly that in an action under section 1983,
money damages will lie in favor of any person whose property is
taken for public use without just compensation by a municipality
through a zoning regulation that denies the owner any economi-
cally viable use thereof. The measure of damages in such a case
comes from San Diego Gas and Electric:25 an amount equal to the
just compensation for the value of the property during the period
of the taking. The court stated that the municipality would be
liable in damages from the time that the owner notified the munici-
pality's governing body that a taking of its property had occurred
because of the zoning classification until it was corrected. This,
needless to say, is a major development in the law of zoning and
will most likely result in many applications and letters to munici-
palities that the zoning is confiscatory or otherwise illegal and, then
after trial, if the plaintiff is correct, an appropriate money judg-
ment will be awarded in addition to the declarative relief.
Creative Environments, Inc. v. Eastbrook226 is an example of an
unsuccessful case which nonetheless sets out applicable section
1983 criteria. There, a suit by a developer against municipal of-
ficials and others was filed claiming that civil rights were violated in
connection with the rejection of the developer's subdivision plan
which employed a cluster concept. Although the court dismissed
the complaint, it did reinforce the holding in Kadar Corp. v.
Millbury, that a complaint under Section 1983 which alleges facts
223. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
224. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366N.E.2d 1271,397N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977); 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
225. San Diego Gas & Elec., Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
226. 491 F. Supp. 547 (D. Mass. 1980).
227. 549 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1977).
to support the essential claim of purposeful discrimination or
knowing or reckless or willful conduct equivalent to purposeful
discrimination states a cause of action under Section 1983. The
action in Creative Environments, Inc. failed for a lack of proof on
this essential point. 28
Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township"9 is a good example
of the application of the abstention doctrine. There, owners and
developers of residential developments within the township com-
plained that the defendant municipality had embarked upon a
course of conduct to impede and delay plaintiff's development
projects. The court held that it would abstain from deciding the
matter until the conclusion of certain state proceedings, which
were in progress, at which time the plaintiff would be permitted to
return to the federal courts. Although a cause of action had been
stated, the court abstained in reliance upon Railroad Commission
of Texas v. Pullman.131 The court recognized that it would preserve
the availability of federal forum for vindication of federal rights.
However, it felt that it should abstain because the entire matter
might be determined on state grounds. The court specifically noted
that it would not apply the doctrine of abstention in a blanket
manner in land use cases because that would foreclose the option
of pursuing federal constitutional claims in the land use area under
section 1983. It is very significant to note that the court was ready
to review those claims if the state action hadn't been already
pending.23'
Less typical is Archer Gardens v. Brooklyn Center Development,
Corp. ,2 in which the plaintiffs who were owners of property in an
urban renewal area instituted an action under section 1983 against
the city and a private developer as well as a sponsor of an urban
renewal project for conspiracy and misuse of condemnation power
228. See also Daubner v. Harris, 514 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (subsidized
public housing); Marty's Adult World of New Britain, Inc. v. Guida, 453 F. Supp.
810 (D. Conn. 1978) ("health" club); Aristocrat Health Club of Hartford v.
Chaucer, 451 F. Supp. 210 (D. Conn. 1978) (massage parlor); T & M Homes, Inc.
v. Township of Mansfield, 162 N.J. Super. 497, 393 A.2d 613 (1978); Couf v.
Baker, 652 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1981) (Condo project); Bossier City Medical Suite,
Inc. v. City of Bossier, 483 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. La. 1980) (certificate of occu-
pancy); Cowart v. Ocala, 478 F. Supp. 774 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (building permit).
229. 507 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
230. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
231. See also Riccobono v. Whitpain Township, 497 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
232. 468 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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so as to deprive plaintiffs of their property without just compensa-
tion. The plaintiffs claimed that the municipality, by threatening
condemnation of their property, created a situation in which the
plaintiffs were unable to generate income from the property. The
result was that plaintiff could not pay the real estate tax on the
property which would then be sold at a much reduced price at a tax
sale. The court held that a cause of action was stated and the
plaintiffs did not have to exhaust their administrative or state
remedies, in the foreclosure action.
More typical is Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky.233 The
court of appeals held that a developer and architect who brought
an action against various public officials who opposed a certain
high rise apartment complex by enacting an unconstitutional
amendment to the city's zoning ordinance, violated plaintiffs civil
rights. The case is essentially one in which the allegations were
made that the city's zoning was done without a rational basis and
therefore deprived appellants of their property without due pro-
cess and in violation of their right of equal protection of the laws
under the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, the court held a
cause of action was stated under Section 1983. The plaintiffs also
predicated civil rights liability upon an alleged conspiracy to have
the city not issue a building permit. The court held that this too
stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
XII. Vested Rights and Developers'
Agreements:2- A Brief Note
While many courts continue to wrestle with the vested rights
concept 5 (at what point does a landowner have a right to proceed
233. 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980).
234. I am indebted to John Taylor of McDonough, Holland & Allen in
Sacramento, California, for putting together recent cases in this area.
235. 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 173, § 5602; 4 id § 104.02; see also Hagman,
The Taking Issue: The HFH et al. Round, 28 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 5
(1976); McCown-Hawkes & King, Vested Rights to Develop Land: California's
Avco Decision and Legislative Responses, 6 ECOLOGY L. Q. 755 (1978). California
was the leader in this area. See, e.g., Avco Community Devs. v. South Coast
Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 533 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542
P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
Also, Hawaii is in the midst of defining the area. See Devens, Overview
Remarks, in VESTED RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 9 (Proceedings of June 22,
1979 Conference on Planning for Growth Management, Honolulu, Hawaii); Life
of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, No. 7240 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1980); Life
with a building project despite a new law that makes such a project
illegal)," it appears that in California, at least, the emphasis may
be shifting to negotiated agreements between developer and local
government. 37 Several cases from several jurisdictions continue
with the increasingly established view that without a valid permit
together with action in reliance thereon, it is difficult to make a
case for the right to proceed in the face of a prohibitory new
ordinance. 38 However, a mistake by an administrator, discovered
much later and upon which an owner relies to his detriment, has
been recently held to result in a vested right,239 as has a sudden
change by the local authorities seemingly occasioned by a land-
owner's particular development.214
In response to the difficulties in obtaining all the necessary
permits needed to commence development in sufficient time to
avoid changes in various permitting ordinances, landowners in
several jurisdictions look increasingly to some sort of agreement
between themselves and local government for guarantees concern-
ing the land use regulatory framework within which they must
develop. Particularly applicable to multi-state developments, such
agreements often cover not only zoning and subdivision, but also
infrastructure fees and utility service guarantees. Such agreements
are common in California and Illinois (where they have the benefit
of statutory authorization) and in some other jurisdictions as well.
As appears below, they are also increasingly popular abroad.
XIII. Pertinent Foreign Land Use Experience
Many of our more innovative land use management techniques are
modifications-if not copies--of what has taken place outside the
United States. Also, increasingly parallel approaches to similar
problems arise. This appears particularly true in four areas:
of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, 60 Hawaii 446,592 P.2d 26 (1979); Allen v. City
& County of Honolulu, 58 Hawaii 432,571 P.2d 328 (1977); Denning v. County of
Maui, 52 Hawaii 653,485 P.2d 1048 (1971); Dalton v. City & County of Honolulu,
51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969).
236. See Callies, Land Use: Herein of Vested Rights, Plans, and the Rela-
tionship of Planning and Controls, 2 U. HAWAII L. REV. 167 (1979).
237. Holliman, Development Agreements and Vested Rights in California, 13
URB. LAW. 44 (1981); Hagman, Development Agreements (2 parts), 3 ZONING &
PLANNING L. REP. 65-71 and 73-78 (1980).
238. Arkae Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Ames, 312
N.W.2d 574 (1981); O'Donnell v. Bassler, 289 Md. 554, 425 A.2d 1003 (1981).
239. Three Rivers Youth v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 437 A.2d 1064 (1981).
240. May Dep't Stores Co. v. County of St. Louis, 607 S.W.2d 857 (1980);
Hanley v. State College Zoning Bd., 430 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 1981).
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development agreements, special courts, urban redevelopment,
and the relationship of plans to laws.
A. Development Agreements
As noted in section XII above, the issue of development agree-
ments is of emerging importance in United States land manage-
ment law. A similar agreement is part of England's venerable
Town and County Planning Laws."' The pertinent section reads as
follows:
52. (1) A local planning authority may enter into an agreement with any
person interested in land in their area for the purpose of restricting or
regulating the development or use of the land, either permanently or
during such period as may be prescribed by the agreement; and any
such agreement may contain such incidental and consequential provi-
sions (including provisions of a financial character) as appear to the
local planning authority to be necessary or expedient for the purposes
of the agreement.
(2) An agreement made under this section with any person interested in
land may be enforced by the local planning authority against persons
deriving title under that person in respect of that land, as if the local
planning authority were possessed of adjacent land and as if the
agreement had been expressed to be made for the benefit of such land.
(3) Nothing in this section or in any agreement made thereunder shall be
construed-
(a) as restricting the exercise, in relation to land which is the subject of
any such agreement, of any powers exercisable by any Minister or
authority under this Act so long as those powers are exercised in
accordance with the provisions of the development plan, or in
accordance with any directions which may have been given by the
Secretary of State as to the provisions to be included in such a plan;
or
(b) as requiring the exercise of any such powers otherwise than as
mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection.
(4) The power of a local planning authority to make agreements under this
section may be exercised also-
(a) in relation to land in a county district, by the council of that
district:
(b) in relation to land in the area of a joint planning board, by the
council of the county or county borough in which the land is
situated,
and references in this section to a local planning authority shall be construed
accordingly.1
42
Much the same occurred in parts of Canada13 for purposes of
governing zoning and subdivision exactions-with mixed results.2"
241. Town and County Planning Act, 1971.
242. Id. at § 52.
243. See infra note 252.
244. See M. Howard Thomas, Municipal Land Use Control in British Co-
lumbia, 14 URB. LAW 847 (1982).
B. Special Courts
Experience of land use lawyers with general court treatment of
critical issues has from time to time generated sentiments ranging
from annoyance to outrage. A popular solution is the creation of
specialized courts to deal with such problems. Such a court exists in
the Australian State of New South Wales: the Land and Environ-
ment Court. It is a branch of the state supreme court, and its
jurisdiction is exclusive. 45 The Land and Environment Court hears
appeals only after the New South Wales planning law machinery
has worked through the local level.2 '
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
24 7
Environmental planning control in New South Wales is effected by
means of an environmental planning instrument which permits
(either with or without the need for consent) or prohibits the
development of land. Legislation makes provisions for three types
of plans: (1) state, (2) regional, and (3) local. Local councils are
empowered to prepare "development control" plans. Such a plan
does not have the status of a local environmental plan but its
contents must be taken into account by the relevant cogent author-
ity when determining a development application. Except in the
case of state environmental planning policies, environmental stu-
dies must be carried out before the making of any environmental
plan. The environmental planning instrument can declare any class
or description of development to be "designated" development,
which triggers a requirement that an application for such develop-
ment be accompanied by an environmental impact statement.
The development application must be made to the consent
authority, which is usually the local council. The state minister of
the Department of Environment and Planning may intervene if a
development application may have a significant effect on state and
regional planning.
An applicant who is dissatisfied with the determination of the
consent authority may then appeal to the Land and Environment
Court. In the case of "designated" development, a member of the
public who objects to the development may also file an appeal.
245. I am much indebted to Justice Jerrold Cripps of the New South Wales
Land and Environment Court whose detailed written explanation of the court and
its workings forms the basis for this section.
246. See A. FOGG, AUSTRALIAN TOWN PLANNING LAW UNIFORMITY AND
CHANGE (1974); D. FISHER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA (1980).
247. Id.
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2. THE SPECIAL COURT'S JUIUSDICTION
The Land and Environment Court is a specialist court exercising
comprehensive jurisdiction in environment planning and assess-
ment and related matters. It also has extensive jurisdiction relating
to the compulsory acquisition of land and the payment of com-
pensation. It was intended that the court combine the characteris-
tics of a superior court with that of an expert administrative
tribunal.
Prior to the creation of the Land and Environment Court,
appeals were generally heard by an expert administrative tribunal
and questions of law were determined by the state supreme court.
Now, the Land and Environment Court has exclusive jurisdiction
to determine these matters.
The jurisdiction of the court is divided into five classes:
(1) appeals brought against decisions of the consent authorities;
(2) decisions, inter alia, of local councils refusing building permis-
sions; (3) compensation proceedings with respect to land con-
demned by statutory bodies; (4) civil (private) enforcement of
environmental laws; and (5) government (public) enforcement of
environmental laws.
The court has very wide powers of appeal on class 1 through class
3 cases (except in those cases where the minister has intervened
and directed that a development application should be removed
from the local council because of state and regional significance).
These include the power to hear new evidence, and to do anything
a local government might have done by way of granting relief. The
decision of the court in all these cases is final except for questions of
law which may be taken to the Court of Appeals.
In class 4 cases, the court has the same jurisdiction as the
Supreme Court previously had to hear and dispose of any proceed-
ings concerning planning and environmental law. The court has
exclusive jurisdiction in this field and only the judge of the court
may preside using the usual rules of evidence. The court has no
appellate jurisdiction with respect to decisions made in plan mak-
ing process, but has appellate jurisdiction with respect to some
decisions made in the process of environmental impact assess-
ment. However, in all cases the court has exclusive jurisdiction for
the judicial review of the exercise of functions conferred upon
persons responsible for the plan making and environmental impact
assessment.
3. THE USE OF ADMINISTRATORS TO DECIDE APPEALS
Much of the work of the court is handled by "assessors"--of which
there are nine-who have certain town and environmental plan-
ning qualifications. These assessors are an important part of the
court since they can handle (either alone or with a judge) cases
falling in classes 1 to 3 (above). (Matters coming before the court in
classes 4 or 5 may only be determined by a judge.) In class 1 and 2
cases the assessors hold preliminary hearings and if a decision is
reached during the hearings, it is a binding decision of the court. If
no agreement is reached, the assessor reports to the court setting
out the facts and his views as to what are the issues in dispute
between the parties. In the hearings, the assessor exercises juris-
diction of the court subject to certain qualifications. Questions of
law that arise in the hearings are referred to the judge for a ruling.
The assessors also have a role in certain valuation and compensa-
tion proceedings. In class I to 3 cases, they often assist the judges in
the proceedings.
4. RELAXATION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
In class 1 to 3 cases, proceedings are conducted as expediently as
possible. The court is not bound by rules of evidence and it may
obtain assistance from professionals in deciding an issue.
Traditional technical rules of evidence have been deliberately
excluded. Courts in Australia have been reluctant to alter the
system under which the courts have operated. Whenever such
changes have been included in legislation, they have often been
ignored by the courts. The Land and Environment Court, to the
contrary, expressed a hope that a more generous interpretation be
given to that section for the following reasons: (1) Environmental
cases have far-reaching effects but it is not uncommon for local
councils not to provide any evidence on appeal because of the local
elected official's unwillingness to take responsibility for hindering
development. Application of strict rules of evidence in such cases
would deny the court relevant and important information.
(2) Assessors who are selected to preside over certain cases are
not trained lawyers but have qualifications in other disciplines and
strict application of the rules of evidence would be an undue
burden.
C. Urban Redevelopment and Enterprise Zones
The United Kingdom experience with urban development cor-
porations and enterprise zones as methods for attracting new
private business into economically and physically deteriorated
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areas is of considerable importance to the United States, which has
experimented with Urban Development Corporations (UDCs)
and is now considering its own enterprise zone program.2B
The United Kingdom's planning policies after 1945 have been
aimed at preventing urban sprawl by establishing green belt cor-
dons and by dispersing the population and industry away from
major cities through the establishment of new towns. The result of
these planning policies has been that war-damaged urban centers
have never been fully rebuilt, which has contributed to their pres-
ent decay.
Recent studies have shown inner cities as compared to outlying
areas have a higher unemployment rate and a proportionately
higher number of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Many firms,
especially small businesses, have closed and the traditional indus-
tries such as manufacturing, docks, and transport have reduced
their work force. New service industries and office jobs that have
been developed in the inner cities have not reduced the unemploy-
ment rate of unskilled workers. The Labour Party's approach to
the urban problem was embodied in the Inner Urban Areas Act of
1978 under which seven inner city authorities were designated as
"partnership" authorities. Cooperation between local govern-
ment authorities at district and county council level with central,
regional and other government agencies was an essential element
of the scheme, and the local authorities were given grants and
enhanced powers to assist industry. The "partnership" schemes
were not a success perhaps because of widespread ignorance of the
"inner city policy" and bureaucratic red tape. 9
In the view of the Conservative Party that took office in May
1979 there was a need to reemphasize the role of the private sector.
To put this into effect two new measures were proposed: urban
development corporations and enterprise zones.
I. THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
While UDCs have had a decidedly mixed response and history in
the United States, they appear to be a major part of the Conserva-
tive government's urban policy, with UDCs established for, inter
248. See, supra notes 7-41, and text accompanying.
249. Loughlin, Local Gov't, Planning and Land Act: Local Government in the
Welfare Corporate State, 44 MODERN L. REV. 422, 439 (1981); DEP'T OF THE
ENVIRONMENT, POLICY FOR THE INNER CITIES, 6845 (1977); A. MCINTOSH & V.
KEDDIE, STUDY FOR THE DEP'T OF THE ENVIRONMENT INNER CITIEs DIRECTORATE, in
THE INNER CITY, at 4 (August 1979) (cited in Research Doc. Guide No. 3, Greater
London Council, May 1980); Cox, Continuity and Discontinuity in Conservative
Urban Policy, 3 URB. L. & POL'Y 269, 286-87 (1980).
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alia, Merseyside (Liverpool) and Isle of Dogs (London Dock-
lands). This is not a particularly new departure from what has
become more or less standard United Kingdom practice with
respect to public-sector controlled development. Both new town
corporations and, to a lesser extent, town redevelopment agencies
closely control development by means of appointed boards under
the loose direction of the central government during the past forty
years, both on relatively undeveloped (i.e., Cumbernauld, Milton
Keynes) and developed (i.e., Peterborough) sites. 0
The UDC in the United Kingdom consists of a land assembly
and development corporation which has parliamentary authority
to manage what it develops. In most instances, it both acquires
land (both by bargain and sale and by "compulsory purchase" or
eminent domain), and may control the use of land within its
jurisdiction provided that power is specifically granted by the
secretary of state for the environment. Broadly speaking, the
UDC may do all that a local government may do, provided the
secretary so provides by order. The purpose of the UDC is to
"regenerate" an urban development area, which may be either a
metropolitan district or (in whole or in part) an "inner" London
borough. 1
The Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) is a good
example of how the UDC is proposed to work. In late 1981 the
MDC published a proposed development strategy 2 outlining both
its proposed framework for public-private development and its
guide for controlling development. It is an initial blueprint for
redevelopment of the over 800 acres in its jurisdiction. Of that
total, over 90 percent is already publicly owned (primarily by
British Rail and Mersey Docks & Harbour Co.). While upwards of
250 firms do business in the area, only about two dozen are of any
size. All the property is along the Mersey River or its estuary; 20
percent is dockland. 3
While it is not easy (or accurate) to generalize (there are roughly
four development areas upon which MDC proposes to concen-
trate) nevertheless the following broad categories of activities are
proposed:
250. See, e.g., Callies, Positive Planning in England, 4 ASPO LAND USE
CONTROLS Q. 12 (1970).
251. Local Government, Planning and Land Act, 1980, §§ 135-71. The order
is reviewable by Parliament. For a full description, see V. MOORE & L. CATCHPOLE,
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PLANNING AND LAND AcT (1981).
252. Initial Development Strategy, Merseyside Development Corporation
(August 1981) at 2.
253. Id., at 5-11.
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(1) Land acquisition in aid of development.
(2) Providing of, or improving, highway access, sewage treat-
ment and other infrastructure improvements to proposed
commercial industrial and residential development areas.
(3) Creation of additional residential development.
(4) Creation of additional recreational and open space land
uses.
(5) Improve, dredge, etc., disused or underused docks."4
Certainly the most potentially spectacular urban redevelopment
by a UDC is the London Docklands Development Corporation
(LDDC). The Docklands' decline date at least from the 1960s,
when the closing of its docks commenced; the last shut down in
1981. The principal needs appear to be infrastructure to lure
businesses which are the key to redevelopment. As the UDCs
urban development area boundaries stretch nearly to the city, it
could be immensely successful. One of the major problems is
transportation, and everything from roadway transport to a new
underground link (the latter at exorbitant cost) has been proposed.
There is already a major new hotel on the banks of the Thames
(virtually the only one in the area) and plans for major commercial
(hypermarket) industrial and low-cost housing schemes are either
in the works or commenced. The location of an enterprise zone at
the Isle of Dogs is seen to be an advantage (it is the only one which
is being managed by other than the local government in whose
jurisdiction it is placed). So far, eminent domain powers of the
UDC have been used sparingly. A large percentage of the land in
the urban development area is already publicly-owned. 5
This double dose of public redevelopment power/administra-
tion-UDC and EZ-at the London Docklands' site is well worth
watching. The incentives offered, the public controls granted (and
the glare of publicity) together with the vast size and potential of
the area provide a unique laboratory to test the various strategies
for developing housing, tourism commerce and industry all at the
same waterfront, inner-city site.
2. ENTERPRISE ZONES
256
Enterprise zones represent a different concept from urban de-
254. Id. at 7-227.
255. London Docklands (Financial Times Survey), Financial Times, March
10, 1982, at 35-38; The London Urban Development Corporation, LAW Soc.
GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 1981, at 117-19.
256. This section is adopted from a report submitted by Peter J. Purton,
L.M.R.T.T.P.I., of Norton, Rose, Botterell & Roche, in London, and Clive
Douglas, LL.B. (Warwick).
velopment corporations although enterprise zones may be in-
corporated within an urban development corporation. 7 Signifi-
cantly, the enterprise zones are to be autonomous and outside,
although complimentary to, the existing policy framework for
inner urban and regional areas. Any effects enterprise zones have
on the existing policy strategies must therefore be closely moni-
tored for the initial ten-year period for their designation and
operation.
To be designated an enterprise zone, the Secretary of State of
the central government must invite the local government or agency
to develop an enterprise zone scheme. The scheme, if developed is
subject to public hearings and final acceptance by the central
government. 8 If designated an enterprise zone, businesses within
the zone will have substantial benefits, as set out in Part I of this
article.
a. The Implications of Enterprise Zones. Since the enterprise
zones are still new, there is little evidence yet of their achievements
or whether the hybrid planning and tax controls have benefited one
type of area more than another. Thus, in measuring the achieve-
ments of the enterprise zones at this early stage what little informa-
tion there is of their operation must be evaluated against the
comments and criticisms made about them before they came into
being.
For the purposes of discussion, those comments and criticisms
are divided into two broad categories:
(a) the impact enterprise zones may have on the planning sys-
tem, and
(b) the taxation implications.
Bearing in mind the purpose of enterprise zones it is important
that the theoretical and actual implications raised by this experi-
ment are considered within the overall context of economic
strategy and land policy.
(1) Implications for the Planning System: Currently individual de-
velopment within areas covered by local plans must secure its own
planning permission.'5 9 Planning permission is a local matter in-
volving public hearings. For enterprise zones specified classes of
development are automatically deemed to have been granted per-
257. Local Government, Planning and Land Act, 1980, ch. 65, schedule 32.
258. Id.
259. McAuslan, Local Government and Resource Allocation in En-
gland: Changing Ideology, Unchanging Law, 4 URB. L. & POL'Y, 215,250 (1981).
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mission. By having a general perimeter definition of what consti-
tutes permissible development, any proposal that conforms to it
will by-pass the protective mechanisms covering individuals likely
to be affected by the proposal. An aggrieved person has no oppor-
tunity to air his objections at a public inquiry, nor will an appeal to
his local planning authority be sustained.
Objections can be made to the council or corporation when they
have prepared a scheme for an enterprise zone and a "person
aggrieved" can challenge the validity of the secretary of state's
designation order within six weeks of it being made.2 However,
once these opportunities have passed, individuals have no chance
to object to a development that meets the general criteria outline
in the scheme. Absence of an appeal procedure deprives interested
persons of an opportunity to make representations about a pro-
posal at a public local inquiry unless the proposal is outside the
class of development specified in the scheme.
The importance of establishing a suitable balance of acceptable
development in the enterprise zone scheme is great. For instance,
to allay fears that large scale retail outlets would flood into zones
disrupting balanced development, upper limits for floor space for
retail outlets, without special permission, have been set for most
enterprise zones.261
Before the details of the enterprise zones were known, there was
fear that the relaxation of the planning control apparatus would
result in a diminution of controls over pollution, safety, health and
such issues. Such controls, as predicted, are still intact in enterprise
zones.262 One critic has said unless safety regulations are stream-
lined, there would be little incentive for small businesses to trans-
fer or start-up.263 However, present information does not support
this theory, and initial indications form Swansea and Speke enter-
prise zones show much interest in small units of 500 square feet."
But it also appears that similar sized "nursery" units outside the
zones are in great demand.265
Building regulations are primarily concerned with the stability
260. See supra note 257.
261. Financial Times, Sept. 8, 1981, at 11, col. 1.
262. ROYAL TowN PLANNING INSTITUTE, PLANNING FREE ZONES: A POLICY
STATEMENT, § 4.1 (Nov. 1979).
263. Parl. Debate, H.C., 1502 (June 4, 1980); Purton & Douglas, Enterprise
Zones in the United Kingdom: A Successful Experiment?, 1982 J.P.L. 409,418, n.
26.
264. The London Times, Oct. 5, 1981, at 21.
265. Id.
of materials rather than their appearance. Since layout and design
are planning matters, if planning permission were not required, a
developer may be able to use cheaper and less attractive materials
which might otherwise not be approved by the planning authorities
because of their poor appearance or weathering qualities.2" Fur-
thermore, there would be no incentive for the developer to con-
sider matters such as landscaping.
It will be a few years before experience demonstrates whether
these fears are groundless or not. To ensure desirable results,
careful attention must be paid in the drafting of the schemes to the
constraints to be imposed. Perversely, tight constraints would
undermine the basic concept of existing zones; thus a balance must
be found and held.
(2) Tax Implications. The taxation implications of enterprise
zones are formidable. Perhaps the most important provision is that
which exempts industrial and commercial buildings from rates-
the ad valorem real property tax. Since local authorities receive
100 percent compensation from the treasury for all rates lost, the
treasury must in turn recover this money through general taxation.
Initial costs have been estimated between £5 million ($8 million)
and £10 million ($16 million) a year, although this could increase to
£50 million ($80 million) in due course.267 While the enterprise
zones are new, this shift in taxation is negligible. However, if
significantly more zones are created, the effect could be marked.
Businesses showing a profit could benefit from capital allow-
ances available to them. Start-up firms will probably not be able to
take advantage of this provision since they may not show a profit
for the first few years. However, since the capital allowances may
possibly be used against tax liabilities in other areas, an owner with
such tax liabilities may acquire land in an enterprise zone to offset
those liabilities.
Together, the rates and capital allowance provisions clearly
make it advantageous to own or develop industrial or commercial
property in an enterprise zone. The positioning of a zone's bound-
ary line is therefore of great importance and political maneuvering
to influence the selection of the boundaries was not unexpected.26
There has been some evidence that firms have been led to believe
266. ROYAL TowN PLANNING INSTITUTE, supra note 262 at 4.3.
267. Parl. Debate, H.C., 1171 (May 15, 1980) (Standing Comm. D., statement
of the Minister for Local Government & Environmental Services); Purton &
Douglas, supra note 263 at 419 n. 29.
268. See supra note 263 at col. 1440.
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certain areas would be included in the enterprise zone. For exam-
ple, a large supermarket had applied for permission to erect an
80,000 square foot superstore in the proposed Isle of Dogs enter-
prise zone." Having obtained permission, the boundaries of the
zone as determined left the site outside the zone. The financial
benefit thus lost could make a difference of an estimated two or
three percent on turnover. 70
As expected, the tax provisions have increased the value of land
within the enterprise zones. For instance, land within the Dudley
enterprise zone is twice as expensive as land outside the zone 7' and
large rent increases have been reported in the Swansea and New-
castle/Gateshead zones.272 Such rent increases are apparently de-
pressing land values on the periphery of the zones."
The elimination of development land taxes (capital gains taxes)
on land sold within ten years may further increase the price of land
within the zones, especially during the first few years when gains to
owners will be the greatest. It is hoped the market forces will
operate to lower land values, but it is too early to predict if this will
happen. There is concern that only large firms willing and able to
pay high rents will be attracted to the zones if rent prices do not
come down."
It is yet unknown how the enterprise zones will affect neighbor-
ing areas. It may undermine the hope for a reasonable spread of
development within an area with an enterprise zone. Enterprise
zones may also adversely affect other equally disadvantaged non-
zone areas with the problem it sought to cure being moved to such
nonzone areas. Opponents of the Salford/Trafford enterprise
zones claim zone designation has merely reshuffled existing
businesses and jobs in the area without creating new ones. They
claim 80 percent of the businesses moving into the zones have
come from a five mile radius. 5 Similarly, in Swansea 25 of 32 new
firms have moved from within the city. 276
It is likely that businesses without heavy capital plant or equip-
ment, such as businesses associated with transport, will transfer to
269. Financial Times, supra note 261 at 12, col. 8; 412 Plan. 5 (Apr. 3, 1981).
270. Planning No. 412 at 5 (1981).
271. Estate Times Review, Dec. 18, 1981, at 6.
272. Id. at 8, 10.
273. See supra note 264.
274. See supra note 271.
275. See supra note 264.
276. DEP'T OF THE ENVIRONMENT, ENTERPRISE ZONE: PROJECT REVIEW (Jan. 25,
1982).
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the enterprise zones. Although historically manufacturing indus-
tries have provided more jobs than other industries, this is no
longer true.277 Thus, zone incentives are not geared to attract
traditional manufacturing industries and appear to be concentrat-
ing on encouraging service industries and light manufacturing
industries such as electronics.278
For new firms or those moving from a considerable distance
there may be a problem of availability of skilled labor. Residents
near or within the enterprise zone will probably need to be trained
unless the enterprise zone is located in an area which until recently
had thriving skilled industries. 279 If skilled labor is not available
there may be a problem of firms poaching from areas outside the
zone.
b. Conclusion. If the interest they have created is any guide, the
United Kingdom enterprise zones will have no difficulty attracting
a sufficient number of firms. Whether those businesses can act as a
spur to the national economy and help to bring about a restoration
of their surrounding areas is harder to predict.
Relaxed planning procedures may prevent objections from
being raised without significantly reducing administrative delays in
view of the health and safety regulations that must be met. Fur-
ther, by specifying classes of development which do not need
individual planning permission, the local planning authority may
lose its power to bargain with developers for infrastructure
development. 20 The local authority will bear the burden if private
developers do not provide the necessary infrastructure.
Schemes should be carefully developed with input from in-
terested persons, since once the schemes are adopted individuals
will be unable to object to their contents. There is a danger that
local planning authorities, earger, to get zone designation, may rush
this important consultation process.
Evaluation of the enterprise zone may also pose a problem.
What will be the criteria to determine success of enterprise zone
measures? New development and jobs may be a measure of suc-
cess. But the experiment may cripple local authorities who may
need to provide infrastructure and who may not be able to get their
277. See supra note 264.
278. Financial Times, supra note 261, at 12, col. 5.
279. Transcript of the Proceeding of the Anglo-American Real Property Insti-
tute, 63-64 (Oct. 12, 1981).
280. These agreements are made pursuant to § 52 of the Town and County
Planning Act, 1971 and hence known as "§ 52 agreements."
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share of revenues from increased property values because the
compensation received from the central government may only
reflect pre-zone land values."
It is too early to judge whether the enterprise zone program is a
success. Perhaps it can only be judged near the end of the ten year
period. Ten years is a long time in politics; whether enterprise
zones will still exist in their present form in ten years remains to be
seen.
D. China and the Plan as Law282
Finally, a word about China and plans that are laws. China is a
planners' paradise. There is no gap between plan making and plan
implementation. Nor is there any private developer to lure or
browbeat into conformance. Once a plan is made, it is the law of
the land, and as all significant development is public, what the
government plans, it simply does. There is no zoning or subdivi-
sion law needed to implement the plan.
As the plan goes, so goes the region to which the plan applies.
The planning process becomes not the most critical, but the only
stage of importance in deciding upon the use of land.
The institutional framework for plan making is remarkably simi-
lar to what most planners say works best. There are essentially
three levels of planning: national, regional and urban. The latter
occurs at the city/village level (the provinces-roughly analogous
to our states-also have authority to plan, but only one has done
so). The national and regional plans, while taking precedence over
urban plans, are largely economic plans. Therefore, urban city
planning, as we know it, takes place at the city and village level.
Each urban plan consists of two parts: a comprehensive, long-
range plan (20 years) and a detailed, short-term plan. The com-
prehensive plan has essentially five components: (1) A natural
condition and built environment inventory, including the regional
context of the city, and its character (primarily scenic, industrial,
etc.); (2) A profile of the population--especially its "skills;" (3) A
map of the city or village, divided into "functional zones" for
industry, warehouses, transportation facilities, housing, public
parks, public buildings, and schools; (4) Infrastructure improve-
ments: water, sewer, power and flood protection; (5) Miscel-
281. 88 MUNC. J. 448 (April 11, 1980).
282. This section represents materials gathered by the author during a teaching
trip to the People's Republic of China in June of 1982.
laneous components such as the protection of historic sites, ancient
monuments, revolutionary sites and environmental protection
plans.
The detailed plan is immediate in terms of application. It con-
tains such things as setbacks from existing and proposed roads,
height, density and style limitations in and around protected areas.
The urban plan is drawn up by a city designing and planning
department and reviewed for approval as follows: (1) For the three
major cities directly governed by the PRC national government
(Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai), all of which are provincial capi-
tals and cities with a population in excess of one million, and 24
"special" (scenic, historic) cities: by the State Council (of the
National People's Congress) upon recommendation of the Minis-
try of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protec-
tion, the Provincial Council, and the local People's Council; (2)
For all other cities, the Provincial Council and local People's
Council.
Thereafter, the plan is legally binding on all public and private
activities, agencies and bodies.
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